Osaka. The G-7 meeting in Japan (end of June 2019) was awaited with much interest in the Xi-Trump meeting and the possibility of a decision in the war between the two superpowers, at the initiative of D. Trump. Perhaps Putin's interview in the Financial Times (June 27th), through an unprecedented attack on neo-liberal ideology, has raised even more expectations on the eve of the reunion (the Russian and American leaders were due to meet in Japan and the quasi-similar hostile views were known of the two regarding some neo-liberal accents), but the focus of global attention remained on the Trump-Xi meeting. And this has a simple explanation. In the last years - from 2011-2012, any prognosis on the size of the international system and its state in 2025, 2030, 2035 and so on - drafted by prestigious US institutions or other horizons - specified that systemic "engines" would work in the future depending on the nature of US-China relations. To give an example: the 'alternative worlds' of the years 2035-2040 were planned - and they are in the number of four - and defined by the way in which the relations between the two "big ones" were then evaluated - cooperation and its degree or hostility and its nature