SUA SI CHINA: RAZBOI SAU PACE? - 2 | publicatii - Politica La Est
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SUA SI CHINA: RAZBOI SAU PACE? - 2

De la ‘capcana lui Tucidide’ la “era Covid-19”
 
Mihail E. Ionescu
 

@realDonaldTrump
Upon information and belief, Iran or its proxies are planning a sneak attack on U.S. troops and/or assets in Iraq. If this happens, Iran will pay a very heavy price, indeed!
8:05 PM · Apr 1, 2020
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1245396884040097792
 
In plina criza de coronavirus, mai mult atunci cand SUA  au devenit  déjà focarul cel mai important al pandemiei globale Covid-19 ( vezi graficul situatiei globale la 1 aprilie ) asteptandu-se la sute de mii de morti in urmatoarele zile si saptamani[1], iar industria americana era trecuta pe picior de razboi pentru a produce aparatura medicala necesara , geopolitica in sens traditional  loveste napraznic si neasteptat. Asa cum se vede din tweet-ul citat mai sus scris  de presedintele SUA, Donald Trump.
 
De ce napraznic ?  Pentru ca, in mod evident, inamicul nominalizat de Trump, a socotit ca America este in punctul sensibil al slabiciunii interne , pandemia lovind si fortele militare- un portavion nuclear are planuri de a debarca echipajul de 4000 de oameni in urmatoarele zile-fiind  ele insele implicate in stabilizare interna si combatere a virusului, iar pe plan international in pozitia cu ‘pusca la picior’ ( SUA au anuntat si amanarea celui mai important exercitiu din Europa, ‘Defender Europe- 2020‘, care ar fi implicat din aceasta luna pana in iulie aproape  30 000 de militari americani dislocati peste Atlantic  ). Asadar, nu doar slabiciune, dar si o scadere considerabila a potentialului combativ ( inclusiv a moralului ). Nimic mai lesne pentru inamic ( Iranul )  sa incerce sa profite, mai ales ca Teheranul , asa cum s-a angajat public , vrea sa razbune uciderea la inceputul acestui an a principalului arhitect al infrastructurii teroriste international proprii , generalul Soleimani  de o drona americana la Bagdad ( 3 ianuarie 2020 ).


US aircraft carrier Theodor Roosevelt. The carrier has a crew of 4.000 sailors.
                  
De ce neasteptat ?  Pentru ca Iranul este unul dintre cele mai lovite state de catre pandemie, cifrele communicate de Teheran anuntand mii de morti si fiind oricum banuite de neadevar in privinta proportiilor dezastrului.  Pentru ca Iranul s-a asteptat, poate ,  ca SUA sa imblanzeasca sanctiunile impotriva sa avandu-se in vedere gravitatea situatiei sanitare si sa sprijine chiar eforturile autoritatilor ( in pofida sanctiunilor amenintatoare ale SUA , Uniunea Europeana a utilizat inteligent un instrument financiar  de ajutor in acest sens si de ieri  ( 3 aprilie ) acesta functioneaza cu directia Teheran ). Pentru ca , probabil, Iranul vrea sa demonstreze ca nu este defel – in pofida pandemiei - intr-o stare de slabiciune, dimpotriva ca este capabil sa aplice lovituri ofensive. Iata raspunsul  de aroganta imperiala  al ministrului de externe al Iranului la tweet-ul lui Trump citat de noi ca motto :

Javad Zarif
@JZarif
Don’t be mislead by usual warmongers, AGAIN, @realDonaldTrump: Iran has FRIENDS: No one can have MILLIONS of "proxies" Unlike the US—which surreptitiously lies, cheats & assassinates—Iran only acts in self-defense. Openly Iran starts no wars, but teaches lessons to those who do
9:04 AM · Apr 2, 2020”[2]
 
Dar mai este un motiv pentru care lovitura ar fi neasteptata. Anume ca se vadeste ca , in competitia sistemica globala care antreneaza mari puteri , pe care pandemia Covid-19 a amplificat-o,  iar  cea dintre SUA si China este proeminenta si in crestere constanta, fiecare jucator  si-a fidelizat aliati si, la randul lor, acestia sunt in masura sa se bizuie pe sprijinul lui ‘big brother’  in propriile intreprinderi. Nu incape indoiala ca China, care a  fost unul dintre pilonii de sprijin ai Iranului in aceasta perioada a pandemiei, ca si inainte de ea,  nu ar ezita sa se implice in cazul unei lovituri militare  preventive sau de raspuns  americane .

Oricum, pentru autorul acestor randuri, o asemenea dinamica geopolitica este neasteptata pentru ca i-a impus evidenta  , pana acum neglijata,  ca actuala competitie sistemica a ajuns intr-un nebanuit de sensibil punct critic, cand o simpla greseala de perceptive or calcul  sau altceva minor poate declansa o conflagratie globala  pustiitoare.

 

Dar nu este singura evolutie geopolitica neasteptata. In Europa se dezvolta cu repeziciune alta. La reuniunea Consiliului European din 26 martie, un grup de 9 state , in frunte cu Italia, Franta si Spania, au solcitat mutualizarea datoriilor statelor mebre si formarea unui Eurobond. S-au opus Germania, Olanda, Austria si Finlanda, iar rezultatul dezbaterii  a fost ca in  urmatoarele doua saptamani sa fie decisa aceasta chestiune. In ultimele zile, responasabili italieni au desfasurat o veritabila campanie de presa in Germania pentru a convinge opinia publica privind justetea punctului de vedere  sustinut de Roma  la nivel european.  In sirul de tweet-ere ale expertului german Ulrich Speck  este sumarizata pozitia tarii sale in actuala criza a UE:
 
Ulrich Speck
@ulrichspeck
 
Crisis: a reality-check on what people think about the EU. Risk: people may decide to throw the baby out with the bathwater -- when they realize that their idea of the EU is not consistent with what the EU is and does, in the real world./
Needed: EU realism -- a pragmatic approach to the EU, based on an understanding of what the EU is in its essence (an instrument of states) and is not (a state-like thing), what the EU can do (coordinate between interdependent states) and can't do (manage a crisis on its own).
Why this is important: the EU as an instrument of states to manage their interdependence is a historic achievement that has brought prosperity, freedom, stability to Europe (with a little help from our American friends). It has everything it takes to continue to play that role.
Way ahead: improving the EU's capability to fulfill its specific and unique role (improving cooperation and coordination between deeply interdependent states) instead of trying to force it into a role that it cannot play (competing with member states on core state functions).
12:03 PM · Apr 2, 2020”[3]
 
Napraznica si neasteptata lovitura geopolitica – da.  Dar nu impotriva cursului evenimentelor. In primul episod am evidentiat cum profesorul Allison extrapolase dintr-un conflict de acum 2500 de ani un concept aplicabil competitiei hegemonice a zilelor noastre. Conceptul si aplicarea lui realitatii de azi a impulsionat cercurile politice la cel mai inalt nivel al actorilor implicate sa ia atitudine si sa comenteze insemnatatea concluziilor desprinse stiintific de analiza ‘ capcanei lui Tucidide’.

Deocamdata sa notam un lucru care este extrem de important in naratiunea noastra. Aproape concomitent cu “aventura” politica a conceptului ‘capcanei lui Tucidide’  s-a petrecut si un alt lucru in plan stiintific. Anume, o altfel de abordare  a competitiei sistemice de tip hegemonic, mai precis vizand actuala situatie sistemica ( cursa intre SUA si China ) . Urmatorul sir de tweetere lasa sa se inteleaga aceasta mutatie de fond in intelegerea competitiei hegemonice:  
Paul Poast
@ProfPaulPoast
Will #COVID19 impact the global distribution of power? Will it accelerate the rise of China& the decline of  USA?
 My hunch: not really.
Why? Follow the money...or more precisely the $
3:47 PM · Mar 26, 2020
Mar 26
Much of what follows is based on what Carla Norrlof, @Bree_Croteau, @aashna_114, @daniel_mcdowell, @whinecough, Hongying Wang, Benjamin J Cohen, & myself wrote in a recent @ISP_Journal symposium on the continuing dominance of the US $
 
Global Monetary Order and the Liberal Order Debate
Abstract. The recent “liberal international order” (LIO) debate has been vague about the institutions and issue areas that constitute the order. This is likely
academic.oup.com
Mar 26
The key idea of that symposium: there are many features of the international system -- economic, financial, and military -- that anchor the dollar's strength as the world's key currency.
Quote Tweet @ProfPaulPoast  Mar 3
The question is this: despite all the worries of USA decline or Liberal Order collapse, the  $'s position appeared to be as strong as ever. Why is that?

The percental composition of currencies of official foreign exchange reserves from 1995 to 2018.

 
Mar 26
If anything, the economic turmoil brought about by #COVID19 is simply reinforcing the dollar-dominance. [This is something that two of my collaborators, @daniel_mcdowell & @whinecough, have been following very closely.][4]
 
            Paul Poast este profesor de relatii internationale la Universitatea din Chicago ( SUA ) si membru al influentei  “ The Chicago  Council on Global Affairs ”, care reuneste specialisti reputati  in relatii internationale . Abstractul studiului de care vorbeste in ‘ firul’ sau pe contul de twitter din care am citat este urmatorul ( mentionez ca publicatia respectiva este ‘ peer review’, deci cu reputatie stiintifica neindoielnica):      ”The recent ‘liberal international order’ (LIO) debate has been vague about the institutions and issue areas that constitute the order. This is likely driven by competing views of ‘liberal’and, perhaps more importantly, by security scholars dominating the debate. From the perspective of scholars who explore the elements of the global monetary order (reserve currencies, international financial institutions, and central banks), the picture is different. Where security scholars point to a decline in US influence, scholars of global monetary politics see continued US dominance. Moreover, monetary prominence has been a precondition for the viability of great power projects of order building more generally. This symposium offers such a counter narrative. While the security challenges are real, the crises of the last decade have actually reinforced the centrality of the US dollar and American financial power in the international system”. [5]
Chestiunea fundamentala pe care a dezbatut-o colectivul amintit de profesorul Poast - cum vom vedea , fiecare dintre autori a ‘atacat ‘ o anumita problematica a dosarului - a fost daca sau nu ordinea liberala instituita dupa al Doilea Razboi Mondial  se afla in primejdie de disparitie . Se intelege din abstract-ul studiului intreprins ca , chiar daca specialistii in securitate international considera ca s-a intrat intr-un ‘amurg’ al hegemoniei SUA in system , realitatea este cu totul alta din perspective financiara. Anume ca , in perioada Trump, dar indeobste dupa absorbtia crizei din 2008, hegemonia sistemica a SUA s-a consolidat.
In acest sens, profesorul Poast citeaza articolul aparut in “New York Times’ la 22 februarie 2020 de Peter S. Goodman , intitulat ‘The Dollar Is Still King. How (in the World) Did That Happen?’[6] Teza sustinuta de Goodman in acest articol, care a generat si simpozionul profesorului Poast de la Chicago este ca “The dollar has in recent years amassed greater stature as the favored repository for global savings, the paramount refuge in times of crisis and the key form of exchange for commodities like oil. The enduring potency of the dollar gives force to President Trump’s mode of engagement. It has enabled his Treasury to find buyers for government savings bonds at enviably cheap rates, even as his $1.5 trillion worth of tax cuts added to the debt. It has reinforced Mr. Trump’s authority in imposing his foreign policies on an often-reluctant world by amplifying the power of his trade sanctions — especially against Iran and Venezuela.”    

Iar acest lucru este constatabil in pofida faptului ca SUA detin cea mai mare datorie publica  din lume ( 22 de trilioane in propria moneda ), ca sistemul sau bancar a avut  in istoria sa recenta cea mai mare criza post -1929 , declansata in 2006 si este inca intr-un process de recuperare a consecintelor ei, ca presedintele Trump atrage critici numeroase atat din partea aliatilor , cat si a adversarilor fata de  atacurile sale la adresa ordinei globale liberale si institutiilor ei. Privind forta conferita  Americii de moneda sa nationala, autorul articolului citeaza un universitar care afirma:  “We’re stuck with the dollar, which gives the United States astonishing structural power.” Un semn al intaririi dolarului american in perioada post- criza din 2008 este faptul ca totalul imprumuturilor in aceasta moneda in afara SUA – fara a se lua in calcul imprumuturile bancare- a crescut de la 10 la 14  la suta  in 2018.  Iar aceasta performanta are loc in pofida faptului ca  sunt alte mari puteri care cauta sa submineze dominatia globala a  dolarului. China, de exemplu, “sought to elevate the role of its currency, the renminbi, to reflect its stature as a has world power. Over the last decade, it has set up foreign-exchange arrangements with scores of countries, including Canada, Britain and Brazil. President Xi Jinping has championed China’s $1 trillion collection of global infrastructure projects, known as the Belt and Road Initiative, in part as a means of expanding worldwide use of the renminbi. Last year, China set up a trading system in Shanghai allowing oil to be purchased in the Chinese currency ”  Pe langa aceste lucruri, Beijingul a cautat , aplicand marea strategie a “ One Belt, One Road” sa construiasca o infrastructura globala- circa un trillion de dolari – aspirand utilizarea monedei proprii in teritoriile cuprinse in acest vast plan global ( in Asia Centrala si Africa indeosebi ) .

Cel mai puternic adversar al dolarului este euro. Moneda europeana , intemeindu-se in principal pe forta economica  a Germaniei a reusit sa depaseasca criza datoriilor suverane din anii de dupa criza din 2008, dar nu fara urmari asupra unitatii organizatiei.  Deopotriva, eforturile facute pentru a mentine unitatea organizatiei, pe langa alte cauze,  au facut sa scada rezervele globale in euro de la 27 la 20  la suta.  Dar intentia Europei este sa schimbe acest lucru: “The most formidable competitor to the dollar has long been the euro. In September, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, devoted part his final State of the Union address to lamenting that the bloc was paying for 80 percent of its energy imports in dollars, though just 2 percent came from the United States. ’We will have to change that,’ Mr. Juncker declared. ‘ The euro must become the active instrument of a new sovereign Europe’.”

Este un argument puternic, in opinia lui Goodman , faptul ca aceasta tarie a dolarului pe piata globala a facut ca unele decizii politice controversate ale lui Trump sa aiba success. “His / Trump- n.n./decision to revoke American participation in an antinuclear deal with Iran and resume sanctions has brought consternation from key American allies in Europe. Germany, France and Italy had looked to Iran as a source of new trade, while banking on the deal as a means of preventing its nuclear reach. Still, Europe abided by the sanctions, for the simple reason that its banks cannot survive the prospect of severing their access to a global financial system dominated by dollars.”  Deopotriva, impactul puternic avut de SUA asupra situatiei din Venezuela , o data impuse sanctiunile asupra exporturilor de petrol, vadeste aceeasi forta dominanta a dolarului, iar incercarile Rusiei de a se amesteca in desfasurarea alegerilor din SUA - arata Goodman - au avut  intentia de a ridica sanctiunile impovaratoare impuse o data cu anexarea Crimeei in 2014, care au determinat mari probleme economiei rusesti
 
Goodman este constient ca aceasta situatie nu poate ramane permanenta : “There are no forevers in the global economy, making this era no more permanent than any other. Some see in the Trump administration’s use of the dollar the makings for a backlash.”  In Europa, trei tari - Franta, Germania si UK - au format un instrument financiar care le permite sa dezvolte comertul  ( hrana si medicamente ) cu Iranul la adapost de sanctiunile americane. China, pe de alta parte , “has its own notions about the rightful course of history. The network of rail, highway and maritime projects it is financing from Asia to Europe is in part about enabling the transport of Chinese goods free of dependence on shipping lanes policed by the United States. Its championing of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is about creating an alternative source of capital.”  Asadar, un alt mod de a raspunde cu success suprematiei actuale a dolarului, care – cum se observa, nu poate fi evitata – cel putin pentru perioada actuala. Dar, incheie  Goodman , “the dollar for now remains what it has long been — the closest approximation to a sure thing in a volatile global economy.”

Este de banuit ca, daca un veritabil simpozion stiitific s-a putut dezvolta pornind de la acest seminal articol privind suprematia dolarului, ca baza a hegemoniei  sistemice americane, asa cum ne spune profesorul Poast de la Universitatea din Chicago , echipa acestuia a citit si alte asemenea articole semnate de Goodman in “ New York Times”  ( banuind fie ca  autorul are surse credibile pentru tezele lansate sau din alt motiv, cum ar fi ‘ simtul’ dezvoltat al jurnalistului in abordarea problematicii geopolitice ).  Am procedat la fel , iar la inceputul anului 2018 am identificat un alt articol cu o tematica geopolitica apropiata celei din cel mai sus prezentat . Este de notat ca acest articol al lui Goodman incearca sa descifreze resorturile ‘ razboiului tarifar’ lansat de Trump impotriva Chinei , la inceputul anului 2018, chiar daca au fost si alte mari puteri ‘prinse’ sub povara noilor tarife americane asupra otelului si aluminiului. Declansarea acestui ‘ razboi al tarifelor’ este extrem de importanta in descifrarea orientarilor  geopolitice ale  primului mandat Trump, mai ales ca este imediat decisa dupa ce  profesorul Allison a fost chestionat in Senatul american asupra “ capcanei lui Tucidide’ si probabilitatii razboiului dintre SUA si China ca urmare a competitiei sistemice pentru hegemonie ( noiembrie 2017 ) .

Asadar,   in acelasi cotidian new-yorkez , la 26 martie 2018 ,  sub semnatura lui Peter S. Goodman, a aparut articolul  intitulat  ‘The Post-World War II Order Is Under Assault From the Powers That Built It’.[7]

Articolul citat are ca tema centrala confruntarea   sistemica intre ‘globalisti’ si ‘nationalisti’, care se reflecta in agresiunea la adresa ordinei liberale instituite dupa secunda conflagratie mondiale care a facut posibil procesul globalizarii. In cuvintele autorului:  “In the aftermath of World War II, the victorious Western countries forged institutions — NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization — that aimed to keep the peace through collective military might and shared prosperity. They promoted democratic ideals and international trade while investing in the notion that coalitions were the antidote to destructive nationalism.”  A devenit insa evident ca aceasta ordine globala s-a fragilizat. Mai mult, Casa Alba a decis unele masuri care au majorat aceasta fragilitate, iar schimbarile de personal in cadrul administratiei Trump arata ca acest proces va continua: “Within a White House roiled by tumult, recent weeks have demonstrated that the nationalists have seized the upper hand from their few globalist peers. Gary Cohn, the Goldman Sachs alumnus who advised Mr. Trump on economic policy, has departed. Peter Navarro, the stridently anti-China trade adviser, has gained influence. Since then, Mr. Trump has antagonized core allies with tariffs on steel and aluminum while raising the specter of a trade war with China.”
 
Nu doar SUA  agreseaza aceasta ordine liberala. Goodman socoate ca “ Britain is abandoning the European Union, turning its back on the project whose very existence is an expression of faith that integration discourages hostilities. “ hranind  astfel o fertila directie de cercetare a  cauzelor aparitiei  Brexit-ului.   Iar “Italy just elevated two populist political parties that nurse historical animosities against the bloc.”  In acelasi timp , “ Poland and Hungary, once viewed as triumphs of democracy flowering in post-Soviet soil, have shackled the media, cracked down on public gatherings, and attacked the independence of their court systems.” . Reflectand politica editoriala a influentului ziar american, articolul refera si la declansarea ‘razboiului tarifar’ cu China si deopotriva la indecizia  lui Trump privind suportul SUA pentru NATO,  in acel moment intr-un punct ingrijorator  ca angajament al Casei Albe  fata de aliati: “When he bypassed the World Trade Organization last week to slap tariffs on some $60 billion in Chinese imports, Mr. Trump reinforced his scorn for multilateralism as the province of weak-kneed sentimentalists. He appears to subscribe to the notion that the United States, the largest economy on earth, must unabashedly pursue its self-interest, free of constraints like naïve reverence for the rules of the global trading system. In Europe, Mr. Trump’s willingness to flout trade rules has combined with his denunciation of the Paris climate accord and his equivocal support for NATO to force questions about America’s reliability.”
           
 
 
Presedintle SUA,  Harry Truman , semnand tratatul de intemeiere a NATO, aprilie 1949.
           
Dar ceea ce , cu siguranta, a atras cititorilor acestui articol o atentie marita  a fost ‘ profetia’ cunoscutului expert in relatiile international , Francis  Fukuyama, pe care Goodman il citeaza a fi spus intr-un interviu  ca : “What you’re seeing now is really insidious, because it’s coming from within democracies/…/ It’s not just the U.S., but Hungary, Turkey, Poland and Russia, where you have a democratically elected leader who is trying to dismantle the liberal parts of liberal democracy. We are seeing a new type of threat that I don’t really think we’ve seen in my lifetime.” 
Finalul  articolului  din ‘NYT’ este deopotriva sceptic- “  History is still running. New leaders may be capable of delivering policies that could restore faith in internationalism. Yet for now, the globalists who have long dominated are losing ground to a thriving nationalist insurgency.” – dar si  stenic , chemand la efort de mentinere a ordinei globale liberale:“ ’ Trump is weakening the United States at a crucial time,’ said Mr. Shearer, the former ambassador to Finland. ‘It’s more important than ever that the U.S. be strong and united and stand up for the values we claim to stand for. This ‘America First, Go It Alone,’ is so wrongheaded. It’s bad for us, and bad for the world.’ ”
A fost – sau este – aceasta suprematie a monedei americane in sistemul international de state, practic in tot ceea ce inseamna globalizare – temelia actiunii politice a lui Donald  Trump  de a restaura hegemonia SUA si in celelate  domenii, inclusiv cel traditional militar ?
 
 
4 aprilie 2020
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[1] Pana acum pandemia a facut urmatoarele victim in SUA:  morti: 5 116 ; contaminate  215 417 https://twitter.com/FHeisbourg/status/1245608285622824961
[5] Carla Norrlof, Paul Poast, Benjamin J Cohen, Sabreena Croteau, Aashna Khanna, Daniel McDowell, Hongying Wang, W Kindred Winecoff,   Global Monetary Order and the Liberal Order Debate
International Studies Perspectives, https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekaa001
 Published: 27 February 2020 .This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
 
 
[6] Peter S Goodman , The Dollar Is Still King. How (in the World) Did That Happen? , “ The New York Times” , February 22, 2019-   https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/business/dollar-currency-value.html
[7] Peter S. Goodman, The Post-World War II Order Is Under Assault From the Powers That Built It
The European Union was forged to promote democratic ideals. But its tenets are being challenged by several member nations, including Britain., ‘ New York Times’, March 26, 2018
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/business/nato-european-union.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer
 
 

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