SUA SI CHINA: RAZBOI SAU PACE ? - 7 | publicatii - Politica La Est
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SUA SI CHINA: RAZBOI SAU PACE ? - 7

 
SUA  SI  CHINA:  RAZBOI SAU PACE ?- 7
                                  De la ‘capcana lui Tucidide’ la “era Covid-19”
 
                                                                                                Mihail E. Ionescu
 
ian bremmer
@ianbremmer
 
Trump Admin has been particularly troublesome for China on technology. And they don’t like the tariffs. But no focus on human rights from Trump, a big win for Beijing. And Trump pulled US out of TPP, the most important strategic balancer vs China.
11:52 PM · Apr 18 2020[1]
 
            Secunda intrebare pe care ne-am propus sa-I conturam raspunsul refera la:   ce s-a urmarit prin aceasta dimensiune colaterala a conflictului prioritar, cel tarifar intre SUA si China ?
            De aceasta data  o privire incrucisata  a datelor de baza  ale  evolutiei  dosarului nord- coreean cu cele ale ‘razboiului tarifar’ dintre China si SUA ne pot sugera o cale de raspuns. Aminteam in precedentul episod ca  lansarile succesive de rachete de catre Coreea de Nord a trebuit sa creeze indiscutabil o preocupare majora pentru administratia Trump. Pe de o parte ‘ asediat’ d e catre adversarii politici interni  democrati de asa-numita  vina a ‘ Russian collusion” , presedintele Trump a trebuit sa consume mult timp si energie  pe frontul intern, iar , pe de alta parte,  ‘dosarul  Coreea de Nord’  l-a obligat in acelasi sens in relatiile internationale. Ceea ce a avut ca rezultat , bineinteles, amanarea punerii in aplicare a propriilor politici anuntate déjà in campania prezidentiala intre care se situa ca problema majora relatia comerciala cu China si echilibrarea ei .
            Trebuie mentionat ca cursul anului 2017, presedintele Trump s-a intalnit cu omologul chinez de doua ori . Prima data , in aprilie ,  presedintele Xi Jinpin a fost oaspetele lui Trump la resedinta Mar- a- Lago din Florida, unde au discutat bineinteles si relatiile comerciale bilaterale. Intelegerea a fost ca sa fie elaborate in comun  un plan de actiune de 100 de zile pentru a rezolva diferendele in domeniu . Este sigur ca oaspetele stia care  este pozitia lui Trump in acest domeniu. In campania prezidentiala incheiata cateva luni inainte  , acesta declarase in mai 2016 la un miting electoral la  Fort Wayne, Ind. ca  “We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country and that’s what they’re doing. It’s the greatest theft in the history of the world.” [2]  Iar  la alta reuniune populara electorala o luna mai tarziu afirmase: “The single biggest weapon used against us and to destroy our companies is devaluation of currencies, and the greatest ever at that is China. Very smart, they are like grand chess masters. And we are like checkers players. But bad ones.”[3]


Liderii Chinei si SUA la Mar-a-Lago, aprilie 2017
             Se poate presupune ca presedintele american era nerabdator sa abordeze dosarul comercial cu omologul sau chinez si a reusit sa-l convinga pe acesta ca in decurs de trei luni sa poata sa inceapa negocierile . Este de presupus ca in aceasta chestiune  presedintele Trump avea déjà planul de actiune pus de accord in comun  de proprii consilieri. De asemenea, ca rezultat al acestei vizite, in mai 2017 a intervenit un acord bilateral, care a permis  firmelor americane un mai mare acces pe piata chineza ( agricultura, energie si finante), iar China, in contrapartida a obtinut facilitate pe piata americana de pui
In aceste luni post- vizita lui Xi in SUA, consilierii americani au primit dispozitii sa investigheze daca importurile de otel si aluminiu si tarifele aplicate acestora  reprezinta  amenintare la adresa securitatii nationale ( 28 aprilie ), iar Trezoreria sa analizeze  politicile si practicile Chinei in domeniul  transferurilor tehnologice , proprietatii intelectuale si inovatiei ( 18 august ).
  Asa cum am vazut  ,  ‘varful ‘ actiunii Coreei de Nord vizand lansarile de rachete , inclusiv  intercontinentale,   incepute in acest an din luna martie si continuate luna de luna, unele dintre lansari fiind esuate, a fost in august-septembrie  2017, extinzandu-se si in perioada  urmatoare cu schimburi acide  de replici/ amenintari  intre Kim si Trump  .
            In zilele 8-10  noiembrie  , presedintele Trump a vizitat China si a intervenit o incalzire in relatiile bilaterale antrenate déjà  in deschiderea violenta si crescda a dosarului nuclear nord-coreean .  SUA au dat semnale ca  este gata sa dea prioritate solutiei diplomatice, iar Kim deopotriva a aratat ca este dispus sa negocieze, facand deschideri catre celalalt stat coreean incepand cu luna ianuarie 2018 ( finalizate cu participarea unei echipe nordcoreene la Jocurile Olimpice de iarna din acel an din Sudul peninsulei ) . La 8 martie 2018   un consilier  al guvernului sud-coreean transmite la Washington angajamentul lui Kim de a nu mai face lansari de rachete balistice sau explozii nucleare cat timp  vor avea loc convorbiri americano-nord-coreene.  Apoi de la Casa Alba acelasi consilier sud-coreean anunta ca presedintele Trump a acceptat invitatia lui Kim  de a-l "meet Kim Jong Un by May to achieve permanent denuclearization."  Americanii anunta concomitent ca , pana atunci  “ all sanctions and maximum pressure must remain “ .[4]


ROK President Moon Jae-in and US President Donald Trump, November 2017
 
            Este poate realist sa consemnam ca aceste deschideri si evolutie favorabila in dosarul nuclear nord- coreean au fost rezultatul nefgocierilor purtate intre cei doi lideri ai SUA si Chinei in timpul vizitei lui Donald Trump in noiembrie 2017 la Beijing . Evident ca la Washington s-a desprins concluzia ca liderul Coreii de Nord are , in privinta derularii dosarului nuclear nord-coreean , o intelegere cu China ( limita superioara )  sau, cel putin, o cautata coincidenta/ concertare  in actiuni ( limita inferioara ).  
Pentru a  avea o imagine mai clara asupra contextului  international  al dosarului nuclear  nord-coreean , vom recurge la acelasi procedeu al relatarii cronologice, de aceasta data recurgand si la o cronologie ( asupra ‘ razboiului tarifar’ )  elaborata de autori chinezi. Potrivit acestei cronologii chineze , iata evolutia  de la anuntul probabilei intalniri cu  Trump- Kim facut in luna  mai, actiunile partii americane ( a se citi: se incepe cu data superioara si se coboara in trecut )
 
June 4-5, 2018: Two days of trade talks between US and China held in Beijing.
May 29, 2018: US reinstates tariff plans after brief truce.
May 20, 2018: US and China agree to put the trade war on hold after China reportedly agrees to buy more US goods.
May 18, 2018: China’s Commerce Ministry announces that it will stop tariffs on US sorghum at negotiations.
May 3-7, 2018: US-China engage in trade talks in Beijing, where the US demands that China reduce the trade gap by US$200 billion within two years. Talks end with no resolution.
April 17, 2018: China announces antidumping duties of 178.6 percent on imports of sorghum from the US.
April 16, 2018: US Department of Commerce concludes that Chinese telecom company ZTE violated US sanctions. US companies are banned from doing business with ZTE for seven years.
April 4, 2018: China reacts to USTR’s initial list, and proposes 25 percent tariffs to be applied on 106 products (worth US$50 billion) on goods such as soybeans, automobile, chemicals (list revised on June 16).
April 3, 2018: The USTR releases an initial list of 1,334 proposed products (worth US$50 billion) subject to a potential 25 percent tariff (list revised June 15).
April 2, 2018: China imposes tariffs (ranging 15-25 percent) on 128 products (worth US$3 billion) including fruit, wine, seamless steel pipes, pork and recycled aluminium in retaliation to the US’ steel and aluminium tariffs.
March 23, 2018: US imposes a 25 percent tariff on all steel imports (except from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and South Korea) and a 10 percent tariff on all aluminium imports (except from Argentina and Australia).
March 22, 2018: Trump signs a memorandum directing the following acts:
•            To file a WTO case against China for their discriminatory licensing practices;
•            To restrict investment in key technology sectors; and
•            To impose tariffs on Chinese products (such as aerospace, information communication technology and machinery).” [5]
 
            Aceasta cronologie chineza reface evolutia evenimentelor din momentul  in care presedintele Trump a declansat razboiul tarifar. A se observa ca, in afara actiunii legale impotriva  Chinei la WTO  “ pentru practici discriminatorii in chestiunea licentelor” , tarife marite au fost aplicate si altor state. Desigur, intregul memorandum  din 22 martie 2017, cand incepe razboiul commercial americano-chinez era referitor in proportie determinanta la dosarul relatiilor comerciale cu China, dar diplomatia americana a incercat sa atenueze socul  resimtit la Beijing extinzand anumite clause si catre alte state ( inclusive aliate SUA ).
Foarte interesant este momentul  semnarii acestui memorandum. Potrivit analizei stirilor publice, momentul ales pare a fi fost legat de angajamentul  Coreei de Nord de a recurge la negocieri- cu probabilitate confirmat/ garantat  de Beijing-, inclusiv  progresul in ce priveste intalnirea cu liderul nord-coreean . Era evident o decizie indrazneata,  care deopotriva consemna faptul ca la Washington se facea o deparatajare clara intre cele doua ‘ dosare’ : cel coreean in ansamblu  ( dar cu importanta marita pentru statul nordic comunist ) si cel commercial  chinez. Ceea ce probabil ca era o provocare adresata ambelor parti adversare – China si Coreea de Nord-pentru ca , diplomatic, sa asume solidaritatea propriilor ‘miscari’ , asa cum si SUA nu facea niciun secret asupra faptului ca avea o alianta stransa cu  Coreea de Sud, coordonandu-se actiunile.  De ce aceasta nuanta diplomatic: intrucat au existat in epoca propuneri ( a Rusiei intr-un anume moment )  ca, in cazul peninsulei coreene in chestiunea nuclear sa fie aplicata formula “dublei inghetari” , adica potentialul nuclear nord-coreean  ‘inghetat’ las paritate  cu armamentul nuclear american in Coreea de Sud.

 
            O astfel de  “provocare”  , cu testarea legaturii intre dosarele nord- coreean si chinez , a fost intreprinsa de Washington intr-un  ‘incident”  petrecut la 24 mai 2018. Desfasurarea acestui ‘ incident’ ar explica si ceea ce in extrasul din cronologia chineza mai sus citat  se numeste  “ reinstalarea de catre SUA a planurilor de tarife dupa un  scurt armistitiu “ ( 29 mai ) .
            La 24 mai 2018, presedintele Trump a trimis o scrisoare omologului nord- coreean   anuland “ the U.S.-North Korean summit scheduled for June 12 in response to ‘tremendous anger and hostility’  displayed by North Korea in a statement the previous day. ‘ If you change your mind having to do with this most important summit, please do not hesitate to call or write’  .[6] Asadar, déjà diplomatic fusese stabilita intalnirea celor doi la 12 iunie , dar Trump o anuleaza printr-o scrisoare adresata personal lui Kim, lasand  sa se inteleaga ca daca acesta vrea totusi ca reuniunea sa aiba loc sa comunice acest lucru telefonic sau in scris.
 
            Ce se intamplase atat de grav incat Kim afisase o  “ terifica ostilitate”  intr-o declaratie in ziua anterioara , iar Trump era gata sa anuleze reuniunea la “ varf’ , dar ca ramane deschis  unui compromis  ?
 
            In scrisoarea mentionata din 24 mai , presedintele Trump  mai adaugase  amenintarea ca  armata SUA este gata sa actioneze daca statul comunist coreean va intreprinde "foolish and reckless" o actiune similara celor precedente , adica noi lansari de rachete . "Our military, which is by far the most powerful anywhere in the world that has been greatly enhanced recently as we all know, is ready as necessary,"  a spus presedintele american. Si a adaugat : "If and when Kim Jong Un chooses to engage in constructive dialogue and actions, I am waiting"[7] Aceasta somatie  a Washingtonului a fost determinata de o declaratie oficiala a Coreei de Nord din ziua precedent ( 23 mai ) , in care se arata ca intalnirea prevazuta ar putea sa nu aiba loc, daca SUA va continua sa  ameninte conducerea statului communist. In acest sens, Pyongyang-ul a citat ceea ce vicepresedintele american , Mike Pence, declarase la ‘ Fox News ‘ cu doua zile inainte, anume  ca “You know, as the president made clear, this will only end like the Libyan model ended if Kim Jong-un doesn’t make a deal.”[8]
Referinta vicepresedintelui american la soarta liderului libian Qaddafi , care incetase programul  nuclear al Libiei  in 2003 in intelegere cu Vestul , pentru a sfarsi ucis in timpul  unei revolte interne in 2011  ingrijorase evident  conducerea comunista a statului coreean din nordul peninsulei. Mai ales ca in pregatirea reuniunii la ‘ varf’ de la Singapore,  Pyongyang-ul se comunicase partii americane ca nu se pune chestiunea unei denuclearizari  totale  ca prêt al intelegerii cu SUA, asadar ca acest punct  nu se va discuta la Singapore .  Viceministrul de externe al Coreei de Nord déjà declarase ca “If the United States is trying to drive us into a corner to force our unilateral nuclear abandonment, we will no longer be interested in such dialogue and cannot but reconsider our proceeding to the North Korea-U.S. summit ” [9].  Deja anterior acestui episod, presedintele Trump lasase sa se intelega ca va fi vorba  in negocieri de o dezarmare nucleara ‘ graduala’ a Coreei de Nord  .


                  Singapore, 12 iunie 2018, intalnirea la ‘varf’ SUA- Coreea de Nord
            Se ridica intrebarea: de ce SUA au fost gata sa torpileze intalnirea de la Singapore cu liderul nord-coreean  , dupa avansul atat de rapid din ultimele cateva saptamani in dosarul nuclear coreean ?  
 O interpretare la o prima citire a incidentului intervenit la 24  mai 2018 ( legat de amenintarea cu precedentul libian)   trebuie ca a fost considerata la Washington ca un element de fortare a acceptarii dezarmarii nucleare la Singapore, mai ales ca nu doar vicepresedintele Pence facuse o astfel de paralela istorica, dar si  consilierul de securitate nationala al Casei Albe, John Bolton. Acesta din urma  se exprimase repetat in acelasi sens.  Or, pentru Pyongyang, cu siguranta ca repetate la ‘ varful’ administratiei americane astfel de trimiteri istorice recente nu puteau avea darul sa-l  convinga sa continue drumul déjà inceput, banuind ca SUA are o agenda ascunsa in afara celei convenite bilateral .


Singapore , 12 iunie 2018
 
Dar sunt si alte posibile interpretari ( speculatii , pentru ca nu sunt la dispozitie documente in aceasta problema ) ale incidentului din 24  mai 2018 . SUA se aflau intr-o negociere stransa  cu China- asa cum se observa din cronologia infatisata- privind tarifele comerciale reciproce  in relatiile bilaterale, iar  lunile aprilie si mai 2018 evidentiasera un progres evident si in acest domeniu. Orientarea Casei Albe era evident si in consens cu declaratiile presedintelui inainte de a fi ales relative la stadiul relatiilor bilaterale si angajamentul sau in fata alegatorilor.
Asa cum Trump s-a aflat in constanta legatura cu omologul sau aliat din Coreea de Sud este de presupus ca asa se intamplau lucrurile si in partea cealalata, consultarile intre Beijing si Pyongyang  fiind la ordinea zilei. Nu atat in pregatirea intalnirii de la Singapore , dar si in ce priveste- este de presupus-  relativ la evolutia negocierilor intre SUA si China in dosarul comercial.  Astfel ca la Beijing si deopotriva la Pyongyang a fost socotit  propice momentul 24 mai pentru o… contraofensiva. Care s-a tradus in scrisoarea lui Kim catre Washington , in care invocand referintele din SUA la similaritatea cazurilor de proliferare nucleara din Libia si Coreea de Nord ( cu nuanta importanta a soartei liderului libian )  desigur ca a inflamat  si Coreea de Nord , cat si Beijingul.
Un alt raspuns este ca SUA au vrut astfel sa verifice cat de stransa este comunicarea- si decizia- intre Beijing si Pyongyang, intrucat  obtinea un argument in plus ca ofensiva “ rachetelor” din anul precedent  a  Coreei de Nord a fost declansata si continuata ( daca nu chiar condusa )  in stransa legatura aliata cu China. Argument care putea fi utilizat in diverse scenarii  , inclusiv posibil a fi dezvoltate de SUA in dosarul nuclear coreean ( de pilda, garantarea securitatii conducerii nord-coreene in schimbul unei atitudini neutre in “ razboiul tarifar” cu America sau altele  ).  Caile diplomatiei in asemenea imprejurari sunt multiple si este  de admis ca momentul 24 mai este unul in care se reflecta atat  importanta atasata de SUA atat negocierilor in dosarul nuclear nord-coreean  , dar mai ales victoriei in ‘razboiul tarifar” cu China.  Iar utilizarea exemlului libian ‘juca’ rolul unei amenintari la adresa conducerii nord-coreene ca obedienta fata de Beijing poate fi extrem de costisitoare. Practic, conudcerea nord-coreeana era indemnata sa fie extrem de prevazatoare fata de comportamentul sau in relatia cu China si sa asume o ‘tinuta’ cat mai independenta.
Este chiar foarte interesant ca raspunsul la scrisoarea lui Trump , care anunta anularea intalnirii de la Singapore, a primit un raspuns rapid la 25 mai . Un viceministru de externe nord-coreean a scris  la Washington  ca tara sa ‘has the intent to sit with the U.S. side.. regardless of ways at any time.’. Ceea ce vadeste interesul Chinei , intai de toate, ca reuniunea de la Singaporte sa aiba loc. Era o alta posibilitate de a dobandi un ragaz in negocierile comerciale  , unde partea Americana era in curs sa aplice  decizii rapide insumand sute de miliarde de dolari, ceea ce afecta desigur economia chineza. 
 
            Momentul ’24 mai ‘ a fost depasit,  pentru partea cealalalta ( Coreea de Nord plus China )  a fost hotarator faptul ca Trump se declarase totusi pentru continuarea negocierilor cu Coreea de Nord. Tratativele in razboiul tarifar au fost reluate- dupa o scurta intrerupere- de banuit a fi fiind in legatura chiar cu pozitia Coreii de Nord si scrisoarea trimisa de Kim la Washington-,  iar reuniunea de la Singapore a avut loc la data prevazuta . O combinatie intre  cele doua cronologii utilizate de noi da masura insemnatatii acestui eveniment in problematica discutata aici.
           

            Presa international: Singapore 12 iunie 2018
 
“ May 20, 2018: US and China agree to put the trade war on hold after China reportedly agrees to buy more US goods.
May 25, 2018: In response to Trump's letter, Kim Kye Gwan, North Korean first minister of foreign affairs, states that North Korea ‘has the intent to sit with the U.S. side.. regardless of ways at any time.’
May 26, 2018: South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un meet unexpectedly for a second time in Panmunjom. The two sides agree to host high-level inter-Korean talks on June 1, to follow with talks between military authorities to reduce tensions and between the Red Cross to push forward scheduled family reunions, to accelerate the April 27 Panmunjom declaration and to ensure that the June 12 U.S.-North Korean summit still goes ahead.
May 27, 2018: U.S. officials travel to North Korea to prepare for a summit between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump.
May 31, 2018: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo meets with North Korean General Kim Yong Chol in New York to discuss President Trump's expected summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. ‘In my conversations with Chairman Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang and today with Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol, I have been very clear that President Trump and the United States objective is very consistent and well known: the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. President Trump has also made it clear that if Kim Jong-un denuclearizes, there is a brighter path for North Korea,’  Pompeo tells the press. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov meets with Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang. Lavrov expresses support for a phased lifting of sanctions on North Korea in return for steps toward denuclearization and Kim states he is ‘always ready’  to negotiate with Russia.
June 1, 2018: North Korean General Kim Yong Chol meets with President Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo at the White House and delivers a letter to President Trump from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Following the meeting, President Trump announces that the summit with North Korea will take place as originally scheduled on June 12 in Singapore and that it will be the beginning of a ‘process.’
June 4-5, 2018: Two days of trade talks between US and China held in Beijing.
June 7, 2018: US and ZTE / companie chineza de telecomunicatii- n.n. /  agree to deal that will allow ZTE to resume business.
June 12, 2018: U.S. President Trump meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Singapore at the Capella hotel in the first summit between the sitting leaders of the two countries. Trump and Kim sign a joint declaration agreeing to ‘establish new US-DPRK relations,’  ‘build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula’ and recover POW/MIA / prizonieri de razboi si disparutin.n./  remains. Kim also committed to ‘work toward complete denuclearization on the Korean peninsula’ and Trump committed to provide security guarantees for North Korea.
In a press conference following the summit, Trump also announced other commitments he and Kim had agreed to which were not included in the joint statement, including the cancellation of U.S.-South Korean military exercises.
June 15, 2018: Initial list of products reduced and finalized. List 1 now implements a 25 percent tariff on a reduced 818 products (from 1,334) and is set to take effect on July 6, 2018. List 2 of 284 new products is also announced and under consideration.
June 16, 2018: China revises its initial tariff list (25 percent on 106 products) to now include a 25 percent tariff on 545 products (valued at US$34 billion). This tariff will take effect July 6, 2018. China also proposes a second round of 25 percent tariffs on a further 114 products (valued at US$16 billion).
June 19-20, 2018: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, Kim's third visit to China since March, to discuss Kim's summit with Trump.
July 6, 2018 –  US implements first China-specific tariffs US.The US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) begins collecting a 25 percent tariff on 818 imported Chinese products (List 1) valued at US$34 billion – giving effect to the first round of tariffs, which were revised and announced on June 15, 2018.”
 
            Ulterior intalnirii la ‘ varf’ de la Singapore, a urmat un an deosebit de activ in relatiile bilaterale dintre China si SUA, deopotriva dintre SUA si Coreea de Nord.  Dosarele ambelor relatii bilaterale au continuat sa ramana legate intre ele,  conducerea nord coreeana manifestand sporadic  o tendinta de autonomizare mai mult sau mai putin pronuntata fata de relatia cu China . Aliatii minori au fost utilizati pentru a castiga ‘ puncte’ in confruntare.
             Numai ca de aceasta data, SUA, de la reuniunea la ‘varf’  de la Singapore  din iunie 2018 a  avut o mai mare libertate de miscare. Intelegerile , nu neaparat istorice, dar  dintr-o anumita perspectiva aparent  favorabile Coreei de Nord – anume ridicarea de sanctiuni si  prezumata  victorie in ocolirea cererii maximale a SUA, a denuclearizarii totale- au creat conditii Americii sa ‘apese  pedala’ in negocierile comerciale cu China. Pe de o parte, Coreei  de Nord  parea a  i se fi deschis   perspective de viitor pentru propriul stat care nu puteau fi usor negate sau subestimate. Nu suntem oare recunoscuti international prin aceasta reuniune la ‘varf’, nu am iesit din izloare  ? –  putea sa se intrebe conducerea de la Pyongyang . Mai mult trebuie ca si-au spus: daca cel mai mare si puternic stat al planetei a recunoscut regimul si nu a insistat pe imediata  denuclearizare totala inseamna ca strategia noastra a avut succes. Desigur – isi vor fi spus- vor urma si alte negocieri, dar vom continua strategia naostra pe aceste baze, poate vom aduce in acest joc si alte mari puteri , de pilda Rusia. Aceasta din urma déjà asumase punctual de vedere ca denuclearizarea intregii peninsula coreene trebuie sa fie gradual, fazata, asadar in timp si incluzand cele doua state ale peninsulei.
            Totodata, evolutiile de pana acum mai inregistrasera un fapt care era convenabil deopotriva viziunii de la Pyongyang. Intalnirile repetate la ‘ varf’  cu conducerea Coreei de Sud incalzise relatiile dintre cele doua state coreene . Statul comunist coreean avea nevoie urgenta de investitii straine , iar sprijinul statului sud-coreean era decisiv.  Aveau déjà experienta optimista a unei regiuni de investitii la granite dintre cele doua state, care istoric folosise foarte mult Pyongyangului. Chiar daca au realizat care este strategia implementata de  SUA-  in fond, despartirea Coreei de Nord de China si de dosarul comercial al acesteia - la Pyongyang trebuie ca s-a rationat ca , mai degraba decat a continua orientarea  de pana atunci – coordonarea cu strategia de ansamblu a Chinei in razboiul comercial – este mai prudent  de a temporiza aceasta colaborare. Cel putin atat timp cat pot fi capitalizate deschiderile de pana atunci- relatii comerciale cu Coreea de Sud si investitii, ridicarea unor sanctiuni de catre SUA- pana cand raporturile chino-americane vor trebui sa-i faca sa reconsidere acest spatiu de asteptare si prudenta benefica pentru ei.  Legatura cu China ramanea insa vitala , intrucat- de acest lucru erau absolut siguri- doar stransa alianta cu marele vecin communist  putea sa asigure supravietuirea pe termen lung a regimului de la Pyongyang.
            Era o orientare bazata pe un joc politic  foarte sofisticat, China fiind foarte atenta ca Pyongyang-ul sa se incadreze in planurile ei de ansamblu in razboiul comercial cu SUA  si putea replica cu duritate la orice dovezi de sovaiala a aliatului minor.   Pentru Coreea de Nord , finetea includerii propriei ‘staturi’ in jocul politico-diplomatic dintre cei mari  giganti , cat de departe se putea merge in aceasta directie, momentul in care trebuia efectuata replierea imperativa solicitau un effort diplomatic extrem de mare  si calificat. Dar Corea de Nord nu se afla pentru prima data istoric in aceasta situatie.
            De aceea ,  la Pyongyang trebuie ca s-a gandit ca nu ar dauna  si o deschidere catre Rusia. Nu  era pentru prima data in istoria Coreei comuniste cand o astfel de deschidere era utilizata in relatia cu marile  puteri. In anii 60-80 ai secolului trecut pentru a face fata presiunii Chinei comuniste, regimul de la Pyongyang utilizase contraponderea relatiei cu Rusia- mai ales ca  relatiile intre cei doi giganti comunisti erau deteriorate, China , dupa vizita lui Nixon la Beijing in februarie 1972, desfasurand o politica evident de intelegere cu SUA impotriva URSS- , ceea ce  putea sa fie util si in acest joc angajat in 2018 . Fie si doar pentru a atenua , daca nu a se pune la adapost,  eventuala ‘pedeapsa’  a aliatului major 
Strategia americana a fost  in urmatoarele luni sa utilizeze intreaga artilerie grea proprie in  ‘ razboiul tarifar’. Acum, ulterior reuniunii de la Singapore, Washingtonul a socotit ca cei doi adversari aliati nu vor mai putea  juca roluri dinainte stabilite pentru a intarzia sau contracara actiunile energice  ale SUA in dosarul tarifelor comerciale cu China. Era o rezultanta atat a faptului ca Singapore a deschis perspective promitatoare – cum aratam mai sus- privind ridicarea sanctiunilor asupra Coreei de Nord,etc. ,  deci aliatul ‘minor’ putea avea o reactie intarziata la solicitarile  Beijingului  . Pe de alta parte, Washingtonul a evaluat ca acum trebuie grabita , circumstantele fiind socotite  favorabile, afirmarea celor grele sanctiuni vizand tarifele  asupra exporturilor Chinei in SUA .
Iata prin intermediul cronologiei evenimentiale composite  ( privind negocierile cu Coreea de Nord si ce referitoare la ‘razboiul tarifar’) utilizata si pana acum , modul in care a fost  implementata aceasta strategie:
June 19-20, 2018: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, Kim's third visit to China since March, to discuss Kim's summit with Trump.
July 5-7, 2018: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visits Pyongyang and meets with Kim Yong Chol ‘to continue consultations and implement the forward progress’ from the June 12 U.S.-North Korean summit. Pompeo characterized the talks as ‘productive’ and ‘good-faith negotiations’ but the North Korean Foreign Ministry released a statement after the visit characterizing U.S. proposals as ‘unilateral and robber-like denuclearization demands,’ further claiming that they ‘go against the spirit of the North-U.S. summit meeting.’/…/
July 10, 2018 – US releases second tariff list US :the USTR releases a third list of tariffs  (List 3) of over 6,000 commodities originating in China (worth US$ 200 billion), which will be subject to a 10 percent tariff.
July 20, 2018: China and Russia block a U.S. request that the UN Security Council committee monitoring North Korea's compliance with UN sanctions send a letter stating that North Korea is violating a quota on refined petroleum products. /…/
July 25, 2018: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo confirms that North Korea is dismantling a missile launch facility and continues to produce fissile /…/
July 27, 2018: The remains of 55 American servicemen who died during the Korean War are flown out of North Korea to be returned to the United States. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un promised to return the remains of American soldiers during the June 12 Singapore Summit./…/
 August 2, 2018 – US tariffs revisions (US$ 200 billion)- The USTR, at the direction of Trump, considers a 25 percent tariff rather than a 10 percent one on List 3, which was originally announced on July 10, 2018. The list targets approximately US$ 200 billion worth of goods and includes categories such as: consumer products, chemical and construction materials, textiles, tools, food and agricultural products, commercial electronic equipment and vehicle/automotive parts. The US Department of Commerce also adds 44 Chinese entities to its export control list that pose a ‘ significant risk’  to US national security.
August 3, 2018 – China announces second round of tariffs on US products -In response to potential US tariffs on US$200 billion worth of products announced on August 1, 2018 (List 3), China’s Ministry of Commerce proposes a range of additional tariffs on 5,207 products originating from the US (worth US$ 60 billion)/…/
August 14, 2018 – China files WTO claim against US- The Chinese Ministry of Commerce announces that a formal case has been lodged at the WTO against the US for its tariffs on solar panels, alleging that US tariffs have damaged China’s trade interests.
 August 22-23, 2018 – US-China dialogue-US and Chinese mid-level representatives meet for the first time since early in the trade war. US Treasury Under Secretary David Malpass and Chinese Commerce Vice Minister Wang Shouwen met in Washington DC to discuss ways to resolve the deepening trade conflict and escalating tariffs. Discussions end with no major breakthroughs.
August 23, 2018: Stephen Biegun, former vice president of international government affairs for the Ford Motor Company, is appointed as the State Department's special representative for North Korea. Biegun will ‘direct U.S. policy towards North Korea and lead... efforts to achieve President Trump's goal of the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea.’Pompeo also announces that he and Biegun will travel to North Korea the following week.
August 23, 2018 – US and China implement second round of tariffs, China files second WTO complaint US-US implements a 25 percent tariff on 279 goods originating from China (worth US$16 billion). Goods targeted include: semiconductors, chemicals, plastics, motorbikes and electric scooters. The full and finalized List 2 can be found here.
August 24, 2018: President Trump calls off Secretary of State Pompeo's scheduled trip to Pyongyang with new Special Representative Biegun, citing insufficient progress on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a tweet. Earlier that morning, Kim Yong Chol, vice chairman of North Korea's Workers' Party Central Committee, sends an angry letter to Pompeo, convincing him and Trump that the visit is not likely to succeed, according to Washington Post reporting./…/
September 7, 2018 – Trump threatens new tariffs- After the public comment period for List 3 of US tariffs on Chinese products ended on September 6, 2018, Trump threatens   to impose tariffs on US$267 billion more. That would bring the total amount of tariffs threatened or imposed by the US on China to US$517 billion, accounting for essentially all Chinese exports to the US. In 2017, the US imported US$505 billion worth of products from China.
 


September 12, 2018 – US invites China to re-open negotiations-The White House’s top economic advisor, Larry Kudlow, says that the US has invited China to restart trade negotiations before tariffs on US$200 billion worth of Chinese goods (List 3) go into effect.
 September 17, 2018 – US finalizes tariffs on US$200 billion of Chinese goods-The USTR announces  the finalized list of tariffs on US$200 billion worth of Chinese goods (List 3). The US says  that the tariffs will go into effect on September 24 at an initial rate of 10 percent, to be increased to 25 percent by January 1, 2019. The full and finalized List 3 can be found here .
September 18, 2018 – China announces retaliation for US tariffs-China announces that it will implement tariffs on US$60 billion worth of US goods (List 3) after the latest round of tariffs from the US (worth US$200 billion) go into effect on September 24.
September 18-20, 2018: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in meet for their third summit, this time in Pyongyang. On September 19, the two leaders agree to the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, which includes agreements to expand the "cessation of military hostilities ‘between the two countries, advance economic, humanitarian and cultural cooperation and exchanges, pursue complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and for Kim to visit Seoul’ at an early date. North Korea committed to dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of international experts and to take additional steps, like the dismantling of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, if the United States ‘takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 US-DPRK Joint Statement.’ /…/
September 22, 2018 – China cancels trade talks with US-China cancels  trade talks planned with the US ahead of the impending implementation of US tariffs on US$200 billion worth of Chinese goods (List 3).
September 24, 2018: South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump meet on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Moon briefs Trump on the Inter-Korean summit and delivers a message from Kim Jong Un. 
September 24, 2018 – US and China implement third round of tariffs USThe US implements tariffs on US$200 billion worth of Chinese goods (List 3), bringing the total amount to US$250 billion. The tariffs carry an initial rate of 10 percent, and will be increased to 25 percent by January 1, 2019. The full and finalized List 3 can be found here/ nu se publica continuarea-n.n./. 
September 29, 2018: North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho speaks at the UN General Assembly. Ri attributes the recent deadlock in negotiations to U.S. "coercive measures" which impede trust building. Without trust, Ri claims, North Korea will not disarm. He states that he has yet to see corresponding measures from the United States to match the steps that North Korea has taken towards disarmament.
October 7, 2018: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang. /…/Kim "invited inspectors to visit the Punggye Ri nuclear test site to confirm that it has been irreversibly dismantled." They also refined options for the location and date of the upcoming second summit between President Trump and Kim/…/
October 9, 2018: The vice foreign ministers of China, North Korea and Russia hold a trilateral meeting in Moscow, where the three parties release a joint statement reaffirming the will for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and calling for the UN Security Council to adjust sanctions on North Korea, in light of its steps for denuclearization. The statement also condemned "independent sanctions."
October 25, 2018 – US and China officials resume contact-US and China working-level officials reportedly  resume contact after weeks of silence. The officials are reportedly preparing for Trump and Xi to meet on the sidelines of November’s G20 meetings in Argentina.
October 31, 2018: The United States and South Korea agree to form a working group to enhance cooperation on a range of issues related to North Korea, including sanctions implementation and “inter-Korean cooperation that comply with the United Nations sanctions.”
November 2, 2018: Kwon Jong Gun, director of the Foreign Ministry's Institute for American Studies (IFAS) and director general of the Ministry's North American Affairs Department writes that North Korea may consider returning to its previous ‘ byungjin’  policy of simultaneously focusing on its nuclear program and the economy if the United States sticks to its current course. “
 

[11]
 
[3] Ibidem
[5] February 26, 2020 Posted by China Briefing Written by Dorcas Wong and Alexander Chipman Koty- https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/- in continuare  se va cita ‘Timeline-CB -26 February 2020’
[6] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron-   intrare ‘ 24 mai  2018’
[9] Ibidem

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