SUA SI CHINA: RAZBOI SAU PACE ? - 6 | publicatii - Politica La Est
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SUA SI CHINA: RAZBOI SAU PACE ? - 6

De la ‘capcana lui Tucidide’ la “era Covid-19”

Mihail E. Ionescu

Declansarea ‘razboiului tarifar’ de catre Donald Trump in martie 2018 nu a fost desigur fara urmari.  Fie numai si pentru faptul ca numeroasele runde de negociere intre oficiali americani si chinezi  in cadrul acestuia  nu au fost defel in  masura sa creasca increderea intre cele  doua parti.  Au fost impuneri de tarife marite de catre SUA pentru marfuri chinezesti si riposte ale Chinei in ce priveste propriile importuri americane care  au creat evidenta unui binom lovitura- contralovitura specific infruntarilor clasice despre care se invata in scolile militare  .

Asadar, o prima consecinta de o importanta vitala: intre cele doua parti nu  mai exista increderea necesara partenerilor dedicati unei relatii comerciale de tip  win-win. Indiferent de rezultatul  de ultima ora al infruntarii - un ‘armistitiu’ incheiat la Wshington de cele doua parti in ianuarie 2020, in plina criza  Covid-19  -  scorul final , dupa mai multe runde de gen ‘tarifar’ sau altfel va stabili daca China a izbutit sa descauneze ca hegemon SUA sau nu. Aceasta este legea sistemului westphalian de state  in care ne aflam si ea nu poate fi ocolita. Un articol recent al lui Gideon ranchman, publicat la 14 aprilie in ‘ Financial Times’ sub titlul  ” Coronavirus and the threat to US supremacy”  , pornind de la teza ca moneda americana  care are primatul mondial se incheie astfel: “ The slogan on the greenback is ‘In God we Trust. The world’s appetite for dollars sends back the implicit message — ‘ In America we Trust.’ If that trust survives coronavirus, so will American primacy. “

Desigur - pentru a relua naratiunea de unde am parasit-o, adica de la declansarea confruntarii , in martie 2018 - ,  aici nu este vorba doar de relatiile comerciale, pentru ca ambele parti au aruncat in joc si alta “ munitie”. Cu alte cuvinte, ‘ razboiul tarifar’ nu se refera doar la tarife, intrucat partile in cursul negocierilor  pot interveni utilizand alte ‘arme’ din aresanalul propriu .   
La inceput , cea mai puternica dimensiune  ‘colaterala’ a razboiului tarifar americano- chinez a fost  ceea ce am putea numi   ‘dosarul nord-coreean’. Am aratat déjà ca  in doar doua luni  din 2018 acest dosar a inregistrat succese care nu au fost posibile  vreme de aproape  70 de ani ( de la sfarsitul prin armisitiul din 1953 a razboiului din peninsula Coreea, care a opus nu doar cele doua state coreene,  ci si America si China ). Dar poate nu a fost suficient , astfel ca mai jos vom reveni la cateva amanunte importante.  Dar trebuie retinut inca de acum: in doua luni de zile au fost realizate performante care au asteptat 70 de ani , anume incheierea razboiului intre cele doua state coreene si negocieri intre Coreea de Nord si SUA.
 
Doua intrebari cred ca sunt corespunzatoare acum  demersului pe care il intreprindem aici.
Cea dintai,  refera la  cine a avut initiativa lansarii acestui dosar pe fagasul solutionarii ?
Iar secunda, ce s-a urmarit prin aceasta dimensiune colaterala a conflictului priroitar, cel tarifar intre SUA si China.
Asadar, cea dintai intrebare: cine a luat initiativa promovarii in prim plan a dosarului nord- coreean  ?
Iata , mai intai , o cronologie a ‘ confruntarii diplomatica si  militar–nucleara intre Nord Korea si SUA in anii 2017-2020:

2017
February 12, 2017: North Korea tests a new ballistic missile, the Pukguksong-2. /…/The missile flew about 500 kilometers at a lofted trajectory. Imagery suggests that the Pukguksong-2 is a solid-fueled, medium-range system based on a submarine-launched ballistic missile that North Korea has been testing for several years. /…/
February 13, 2017: Kim Jong Nam, the older half-brother of Kim Jong Un, is killed in an airport in Malaysia. /…/. North Korea denies responsibility for the assassination. 
March 6, 2017: North Korea launches four ballistic missiles from a region near North Korea's border with China. The missiles fly about 1,000 kilometers and land in Japanese economic exclusion zone, about 300 kilometers off the coast Japan. 
April 5, 2017: North Korea tests a ballistic missile. The missile explodes shortly after the launch.
April 6, 2017: U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet and agree to cooperate more closely on achieving denuclearization of North Korea.  
April 16, 2017: North Korea tests a ballistic missile. The missile explodes shortly after the launch. 
April 17, 2017: Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Susan Thornton, tells reporters about the U.S. policy toward North Korea, which officials describe as "maximum pressure and engagement." /…/Washington is looking for a "tangible signal" from North Korea about its seriousness in engaging in talks and there is not a "specific precondition." 
April 27, 2017: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson says in an interview with NPR that the United States is open to direct talks with North Korea on the "right agenda." He says that denuclearization is still the goal for any agreement. 
May 2, 2017: The THAAD missile defense system / system american  anti-racheta de teatru – n.n./ becomes operational in South Korea. 
May 9, 2017: Moon Jae-in is elected president of South Korea. Moon supports engagement with North Korea, but says talks cannot occur while Pyongyang continues to conduct nuclear and missile tests.  
May 14, 2017: North Korea tests the Hwasong-12 missile. The missile test is successful with a range of 4,800 kilometers on a standard trajectory, making it an intermediate-range ballistic missile. 
June 29-30, 2017: South Korean President Moon Jae-in meets with U.S. President Donald Trump at a summit in Washington, DC. The leaders pledge to continue working together on North Korea.  
July 3, 3017: North Korea tests its Hwasong-14 ballistic missile. Initial analysis of the test indicates that the range would have been about 6,700 kilometers at a standard trajectory, making it an ICBM. 
July 28, 2017: Japan, South Korea, and the United States report that North Korea tested an ICBM. Initial analysis of the test indicates a range of about 10,400 km , not taking into account the rotation of the Earth, putting Los Angeles, Denver and Chicago within range. Russia claimed the missile was a medium-range ballistic missile.
August 5, 2017: The UN Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 2371, which imposes additional sanctions, including a complete ban on the export of coal, iron, seafood and lead, on North Korea in response to the July ICBM tests.
August 8, 2017: A leaked Defense Intelligence Agency report found that North Korea has produced miniaturized nuclear warheads for ballistic missile delivery, including for ICBMs. On the same day, in response to North Korean criticism of the United States, President Trump told reporters that ‘North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States.... They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.’
August 9, 2017: In response to Trump's remarks, North Korea made a statement detailing a plan to test four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which would fly over Japan and land in the waters 30-40km from the coast of Guam.  
August 10, 2017: Trump told reporters that his previous threat of ‘fire and fury should North Korea continue to threaten the United States may not have been ‘tough enough’.
August 11, 2017: Trump tweeted: ‘military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded, should North Korea act unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong Un will find another path!’
August 14, 2017: Kim Jong Un declares that after receiving Guam strike plans, he will wait to see what Washington's next move is before making a decision.”

In aceste zile a avut loc intalnirea intre Steve Bannon si H. Kissinger , relatata intr-unul din episoadele anterioare. Cum am aratat, practic subiectul principal  discutiei celor doi nu a fost criza declansata de Coreea de Nord, ci stadiul relatiei SUA- China si solutia in acest domeniu. Ceea ce lasa sa  se inteleaga, ca la Washington se evalua ca actiunile lui Kim erau in  facute in stransa legatura cu Beijingul- de inteles, intr-un anume fel, intre aceste doua state existand vechi relatii de securitate , iar sprijinul chinez in timpul razboiului din Coreea  a fost decisiv in echilibrarea situatiei militare si incheierea armistitiului inca in fiinta . La granite dintre cele doua state coreene  exista o zona demilitarizata  si un  punct la Panmunjon, unde s-au semnat actele armisitiului,  iar azi sunt la cativa metri unul de celalalt militari ai celor doua parti .

Desigur, se poate specula ca- stiindu-se din angajamentele lui Trump in timpul campanbiei electorale ca realizarea a aceea ce el considera a fi o echilibrare a relatiei cu China urma sa fie declansata mai devreme sau mai tarziu, in buna judecata strategica – din nou este o    speculatie- China a recurs la ceea ce se cheama deflectare in strategia indirect.

“ August 25, 2017: North Korea tests three short-range ballistic missiles to the northeast, two of which flew about 155 miles, and one of which blew up immediately.
August 28, 2017: North Korea tests its Hwasong-12 missile, which flew over 2,700 km and overflew Japan. In a statement the next day, President Trump claims ‘all options are on the table.’
September 2, 2017: North Korea official state media releases photos of Kim Jong  Un with what it claims is a thermonuclear weapon small enough to fit on an ICBM that could reach the continental United States.
September 3, 2017: North Korea conducts its sixth nuclear test, claiming the device tested was a hydrogen bomb and the test was a ‘perfect success.’ Seismic activity indicates that North Korea did conduct its largest nuclear test to date at 3:30 UTC. The initial estimate from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is that the seismic event's magnitude was around 5.8, occurred at a very shallow depth, and took place in the immediate vicinity of North Korea's Pyunggye-ri test site. Based on the seismic data, a number of experts assess the device had an explosive yield in excess of 100 kilotons TNT equivalent, which is significantly higher than North Korea's past nuclear tests. North Korea's claim that the device was a hydrogen bomb cannot be independently substantiated but the higher yield could be indicative of a boosted fission or thermonuclear device. The CTBTO's seismic estimate was later revised to 6.1 on September 7.
September 11, 2017: The UN Security Council passes UNSCR 2375 imposing additional sanctions on North Korea, including a ban on textile exports and a cap on refined petroleum product imports. 
September 15, 2017: North Korea conducts a ballistic missile test. The test appears to be an intermediate-range Hwasong-12. The missile over flew Japan on a standard trajectory and reportedly traveled about 3,700 kilometers. 
September 19, 2017: In his first address to the UN General Assembly, President Trump threatens to ‘totally destroy North Korea,’ if the United States is forced to defend itself or its allies, adding ‘Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.’

September 21, 2017: President Trump issues an executive order imposing additional sanctions on entities that facilitate financial transactions and trade with North Korea.
September 21, 2017: Kim Jong Un responds to Trump’s UN speech with an unprecedented statement under his own name, calling Trump’s behavior ‘mentally deranged’  and asserting that ‘a frightened dog barks louder.’
September 23, 2017: U.S. B1-B strategic bombers fly  near North Korea’s coast, the farthest north they have flown in the 21st century.Trump tweets  that North Korea ‘wouldn’t be around much longer’ if he echoes ‘Little Rocket Man.’
September 25, 2017: At a press conference in New York, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho claims that Trump’s comments at the UN General Assembly and on Twitter constituted a declaration of war and that North Korea therefore has a right to shoot down U.S. strategic bombers. 
October 19, 2017: Speaking at a Foundation for Defense and Democracy event, U.S. national security advisor H.R. McMaster rejects deterrence with North Korea, insisting on the country's complete denuclearization.
November 6, 2017: U.S. President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Abe meet during Trump's visit to Japan.
November 7, 2017: President Trump delivers an address to the South Korean National Assembly. In his speech, he states that in order to begin talks, Pyongyang would need to first take steps towards denuclearization. 
November 8, 2017: U.S. President Trump meets with South Korean President Moon Jae-In. The two leaders emphasize that they will work together to counter the threat posed by North Korea and call on China to use its leverage to achieve a diplomatic solution.”

Este pentru prima data cand , in mod public, pentru ca,  in convorbiri confidential cu aliatii, Trump a discutat desigur in detaliu acest lucru, China este chemata sa utilizeze influenta sa pe langa Kim pentru a gasi o solutie actualei crize dezvoltate de Coreea de Nord.  Acest lucru arata ca la Washington a fost inteleasa ‘mutarea’ facuta de Beijing si i se cere sa inceteze in mod direct . In declaratii anterioare facute de la nivel de  presedinte pana  la alte importante oficialitati, SUA au aratat ca pozitia sa este denuclearizarea Coreei de Nord, atat si nimic mai mult sau mai putin.  La acest moment, China este chemata sa contribuie la solutionarea diplomatica a actualei crize , aratand ca Washingtonul  este deschis  negocierii .

November 20, 2017: President Trump officially designates North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. North Korea had been previously designated as a state sponsor of terrorism but was removed  from the list in 2008.
November 29, 2017: North Korea launches  an intercontinental ballistic missile from Pyongsong at 3:17 am local time, which flew for about 53 minutes, traveling 1000 km on a lofted trajectory and landing in the Sea of Japan. The U.S. State Department releases a statement condemning the test but declaring that ‘diplomatic options remain open and viable, for now.’
December 22, 2017: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 2397, imposing additional sanctions on North Korea.
2018
January 1, 2018: Kim Jong Un announces in his annual New Year address that North Korea's nuclear forces are ‘capable of thwarting and countering any nuclear threats from the United States’ and says North Korea will mass produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles for deployment. Kim offers to send a delegation to South Korea for the upcoming Olympics and calls for talks with Seoul to discuss the prospects of North Korea's participation.
January 2, 2018: South Korea says it is willing to meet with North Korea and proposes talks at Panmunjom. To discuss the possibility of talks, North Korea reestablishes a hotline between the two states that it had disconnected nearly two years ago after the Kaesong industrial complex was shut down.
January 4, 2018: President Trump and President Moon Jae-in agree  to postpone the annual ‘ Foal Eagle’  U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises until after the Winter Olympics in South Korea in an effort to ‘de-conflict’  the Games and ‘focus on ensuring the security’  of the event.
January 9, 2018: Representatives from North and South Korea meet  at Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone for the first inter-Korean talks since 2015. North Korea announces it will send a delegation to the 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea, although it makes a ‘strong complaint’ after South Korean representatives propose talks on denuclearization. 
January 16, 2018: Canada and the United States co-host a summit in Vancouver with foreign ministers from 20 countries that supported South Korea under the UN flag in the Korean War to discuss North Korea. Implementation and enforcement of existing UN sanctions on North Korea is a key focus of the meeting. U.S. Secretary of State Rex  Tillerson reiterates the U.S. rejection of the Russian-Chinese ‘ freeze-for-freeze’ proposal and the position that North Korea must demonstrate a commitment to denuclearization before talks can begin.
February 8, 2018: North Korea holds a military parade where it displays a new solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile. Among other missiles, the parade also shows off two different intercontinental ballistic missile designs, the Hwasong-14 and the Hwasong-15, both of which were tested in 2017. 
February 10, 2018: Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un's sister, meets with South Korean President Moon Jae-in in the Presidential Blue House in Seoul, and invites Moon Jae-in to visit Pyongyang for a summit meeting. Kim Yo Jong attended the Winter Olympics from February 9-11, once sitting a row behind U.S. Vice President Mike Pence. A scheduled meeting between Pence and Kim Yo Jong was reportedly cancelled when Kim Yo Jong pulled out at the last minute, citing new U.S. sanctions and Pence's meeting with North Korean defectors.
March 5, 2018: Two top aides of South Korean President Moon Jae-in meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Chung Eui-yong, Moon's national security advisor, and Suh Hoon, South Korean director of the National Intelligence Service, are the first South Korean envoys sent to North Korea in 11 years.
March 6, 2018: South Korean officials report that North Korea ‘expressed its willingness to begin earnest negotiations with the U.S. to discuss denuclearization issues,’ as long as its security is guaranteed as part of a five-point agreement that Kim Jong Un and two South Korean envoys reached during their visit to North Korea. The two countries reportedly also agree on a North-South Korean summit at the end of April, establishing a hotline between President Moon and Kim, that North Korea would not conduct missile tests during U.S.-North Korean talks and that North Korea would not use nuclear or conventional weapons against South Korea.
March 8, 2018: South Korean National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong  from the White House lawn following his meeting with Trump, announces that Trump accepted Kim Jong Un's invitation to meet Kim Jong Un by May to achieve permanent denuclearization.
March 25-28, 2018: Kim Jong Un visits Beijing, meeting with President Xi Jinping, in his first trip outside of North Korea since taking power in 2011 and his first meeting with another head of state “ .

Cum se poate observa, in luna martie 2018  in care Trump a lansat ‘razboiul tarifar’ cu China ‘ dosarul’  Coreea de Nord se dezvoltase pe directiile mai sus mentionate.  Este cazul sa mentionez ca , cu mici modificari, am recurs la o cronologie mult mai ampla efectuata de organizatie care are ca obiect de activitate studierea conbtrolul armamentelor, selectand ceea ce este necesar pentru intelegerea demersului efectuat aici.

Coreea de Nord a recurs cu multe luni inainte de lansarea ‘ razboiului tarifar’ SUA- China in martie 2018 la o suita de teste cu rachete nucleare, atingand ‘ varful’  in lunile august-noiembrie 2017 , cand schimbul de  replici intre cele doua parti a devenit extrem de alarmant. Mai ales ca SUA au inteles ceea ce comunica in fapt Coreea de Nord prin aceste teste, anume ca pot atinge nuclear teritoriul american. Ceea ce este mai putin de inteles si ne ajuta la cristalizarea raspunsului la prima intrebare  ridicata de noi la inceputul acestui episode este atitudinea Chinei. Desi Beijingul are un tratat de alianta  si de securitate cu Coreea de Nord, China a votat in Consiliul de Securitate al ONU pentru aplicarea de sanctiuni Pyongyang-ului in cursul anului 2017 pentru calcarea legislatiei internationale privind neproliferarea armelor nucleare  fara sa exercite niciun  effort de ‘ moderare’ a aliatului. Desigur, comportamentul lui Kim, inclusiv fata de Beijing, a fost unul  pe care l-am numi cu blandete ca ‘ rebel’ , iar din aceasta perspectiva este cunoscuta preferinta istorica a  conducerii  nord-coreene de a respinge tutela hegemonic chineza . Fondatorul actualei dinastii comuniste nord-coreene, Kim Il Sung , a fost foarte ferm in a respinge incercarile Beijingului de a exporta  in Coreea de Nord ‘ inovatiile’ politice ale anilor ’60 si ’70 , reusind sa-si consolideze puterea si a se feri , de pilda, de importul ‘ revolutiei culturale’ din China. Intr-o carte consacrata relatiilor dintre Romania si Coreea de Nord in timpul regimului communist din Romania, can dele au cunoscut o ampla evolutie, am identificat in stenogramele convorbirilor  dintre liderii celor doua state comuniste aceasta nota indiscutabila a conducerii nord- coreene fata de puternicul vecin si aliat.  In 1980, Kim Il Sung a spus intr-o convorbire cu N. Ceausescu : “ During the Great Proletarian  Revolution of China, our reports / intre China si Coreea de Nord- n.n./   were rather bad. We have a common  border with China on a distance  of 1450  Km. , where they placed all sorts of microphones and stations calling to battle  against Korean revisionism. At that time, Zhou Enlai  sent us several messages. He assured  us that this is just rowdy behavior  from hot-headed youth and that is not representative for their views and that we should  not worry, as it will pass. What were we supposed to do ? We endured” .

Dar , ceea ce nu  mai trebuie dezvoltat, Beijingul stia foarte bine ca  presedintele american  Trump declarase repetat pozitia sa fata de relatiile economice dintre China si SUA si era in asteptarea celei dintai ‘miscari’ a acestuia  in aceasta privinta, care nu putea intarzia prea mult. Desigur ca nu a fost arhitectul acestei cascade de experimentari nord-coreene desfidand legislatia international , desigur ca a votat in Consiliul de securitate impotriva propriului aliat pentru sanctiunile de condamnare, desigur ca poate a convenit acest comportament al Pyongyang-ului pentru ca  astfel se inocula la Washington si- mai ales- presedintelui Trump , déjà supus unei opozitii interne extrem de puternice in ce priveste asa-numita  “ Russian collusion” , o alta directive de actiune consumatoare de timp  si effort multilateral ( politic, dimplomatic, military, financiar, etc. ) . In acest fel era manata directionarea administratiei Trump catre problematica ‘ razboiului tarifar’ . Poate ca au ecistat incercari ale Beijingului de a ‘ calma’ elanul nuclear al aliatului communist, stiuta fiind relatia de securitate dintre cele doua state , dar cu siguranta ele s-au vadit inutile in fata unui Pyongyang  care a considerat ca supravietuirea regimului si dinstiei comuniste la conducere este legata de acest effort de dotare cu arma nuclear a statului, care sa-I asigure supravietuirea. Este un capitol de istoie diplomatic deloc stiut- asa cum nu se stiu nici amanunte privind modul in care Coreea de Nord a reusit aceste performante tehnologice in domeniul armei nucleare si rachetelor -, in care viitorul poate sa aduca elemente semnificative  si revelatoare.

Ceea ce trebuie retinut in acest stadiu al demersului, este faptul ca SUA comunicase pozitia proprie- ‘denuclearizarea’ Coreei de Nord, respingand asadar  formula ‘dublei inghetari’  ( retragerea armamentului nuclear american din Coreea de Sud), precum si ‘ descurajarea’ insemnand practic recunoasterea Pyongyang-ului ca actor nuclear. Preparativele erau consistente, toti ‘jucatorii’ stiind dinainte mpozitiile proprii.

Era oarecum surprinzator ca Pyongyangul accepta denuclearizarea , fara a revendica in schimb garantii de securitate- la un moment dat o asemuire a tarii sale cu denuclearizarea Libiei lui Gaddafi, facuta de John Bolton, consilierul de securitate nationala al lui Trump, a atras reactia  negativa imediata a lui Kim- , dar desigur era posibil sa fie rezervat ca un subiect de negociere ( probabil ca daca cineva ar fi vrut sa torpileze negocierile SUA- Coreea de Nord  ar fi utilizat public acest exemplu , banuind ce imagine si intrebari vor naste in capital nord- coreeana !) .   

Ceea ce era insa evident receptionata foarte puternic public , preum si in cancerlariile diplomatice interesate era teza  ca China exercita, daca nu un control total asupra ‘ miscarilor’  Pyongyang-ului, cel putin  o mare influenta trebuie sa fie acceptata ca in limita posibilului . De aceea, probabil  inca din noiembrie 2017 presedintele Trump a utilizat aceasta teza, efectiv oferind si Pyongyang-ului o ‘iesire’ din eventualitatea unui raspuns  american la comportamentul  de genul  ‘ fire and fury’ .  Ce fel de rol isi asumase  Kim in acest joc diplomatic de o complexitate deosebita, in care atat cele doua state coreene , cat si SUA si China, dar si Japonia erau profund  implicate, este  inca  neclar. Ceea ce trebuie acceptat ca , avand in vedere complexitatea acestui ‘joc’  dimplomatic cu atat de multi jucatori, precum si cu consecinte de amvergura globala, este ca nu el era cel chemat sa detina controlul si     sa-l  conduca , intr-un anume fel  punand in ‘umbra’ aliatul sau puternic, China.  Controlul nu putea sa-l aiba, avand in vedere resursele de tot felul la dispozitie, decat  Beijingul. Ceea ce nu insemna ca rolul si locul lui Kim nu aveau semnificatie si autonomie marcata , asa cum se va si vadi curand.

Ceea ce a fost curand evident este ca , pe taram diplomatic,  din martie pana in iunie-iulie 2018  s-au facut pasi extrem de importanti si deopotriva deloc  de asteptat dupa salvele retorice utilizate anterior atat de catre presedintele american Trump, cat si de omologul sau nord- coreean .

15 aprilie 2020

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