SUA SI CHINA: RAZBOI SAU PACE ?- 1 | publicatii - Politica La Est
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SUA SI CHINA: RAZBOI SAU PACE ?- 1


 De la ‘capcana lui Tucidide’ la “era Covid-19”

                                                                       @carlbildt
This is the first great crisis of the post-American world. The UN Security Council is nowhere to be seen, G20 is in the hands of the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and the White House has trumpeted America First and Everyone Alone for years. Only the virus is globalized.
                   11:43 AM · Apr 1, 2020 from Stockholm, Sweden
 
                                                                                    Mihail E. Ionescu
 
            Pandemia globala cunoscuta sub numele de Covid-19, declansata in China in noiembrie 2019, a cuprins déjà  intreaga lume si nu da deloc semne de absorbtie. Impactul acesteia asupra sistemului international de state este dificil de masurat deocamdata. Ceea ce stim acum sunt , pe langa numarul mortilor in continua crestere- mai ales in statele europene, Italia si Spania, in primul rand, dar si in SUA-, modalitatile si strategiile asumate de diverse state pentru a se masura cu inamicul ‘invizibil’ si pierderiel umane inregistrate, anuntate zilnic precum comunicatele de razboi. Se dezvolta  si apar cele mai diverse opinii referitoare la viitorul globalizarii, la sanatatea sistemului economic global, la modalitatile de iesire din aceasta criza, la posibilitatea aparitiei unui vaccin salvator, se fac predictii asupra numarului de morti, global sau pe tari  .  Au fost déjà luate masuri pentru conservarea tesaturii economice a statelor fiind alocate sume uriase  ( peste 2 trilioane  dolari in SUA, ‘ nelimitat’ in Germania, doar Uniunea Europeana intarziind elaborarea unui plan comun atat de necesar pentru existenta sa de viitor ) astfel incat o data absorbita pandemia sa poate fi reluat procesul productiv.
 
            Un dosar important al acestui impact e reprezentat de evolutiile geopolitice globale. Sunt ele altele decat cele aflate in  dezvoltare la declansarea pandemiei ? Sau aceste evolutii au ramas aceleasi , doar ca aparitia pandemiei  Covid-19 a determinat   amplificarea  si accelerarea lor ?  S-au schimbat rivalitatile sistemice ca urmare a pandemiei ori ele s-au adancit si, mai ales, ameninta sanatatea sistemului international de state cu flagelul unui nou razboi mondial ?
 Intr-un cuvant: incotro ?
 
            In cele publicate pana acum pe acest site referitor la Covid-19 , am incercat sa desprind trasaturi specifice ale impactului geopolitic al aparitiei si dezvoltarii pandemiei , identificand aparitia unei rivalitati sistemice de veche data ( circa un deceniu ) , la inceput doar sub o forma specifica a competitiei referitoare la modelele de dezvoltare social –politica si economica promovate de cele doua state : SUA,detinator al hegemoniei globale si China, aspirantul la acest loc de invidiat .
 
            Pentru ca aceasta rivalitate geopolitica nu este noua si intrucat ea implica direct viitorul sistemului international de state- intre altele si viitorul UE si al Romaniei- am socotit neaparat trebuincios sa fac o sinteza a acestui dosar fascinant , de la aparitia lui si pana la ‘era Covid-19’ pe care o strabatem .
 
                                                                        Capcana lui Tucidide
 
            Intre anii 2012-2014 s-a dezvoltat in spatial academic international- de unde a fost preluat in limbajul politic al  marilor puteri, indeosebi in China si SUA- conceptul esentializat in sintagma  “ capcana lui Tucidide” . Inventatorul acestui concept este istoricul si  expertul american in stiinte politice ( profesor la Harvard University ) Graham Allison. El a publicat in august 2012 un articol in ‘ Financial Times’[1]   in care a facut analogia istorica a situatiei actuale cu perioada premergatoare vestitului “ razboi peloponesiac” purtat in secolul V i. e.n. intre blocurile militare ale Atenei si Spartei. Acest   concept este definit ( intemeiat pe studiul uneia dintre cele mai vechi carti ale antichitatii, “ Razboiul peloponeziac ”  scrisa de Tucidide, aristocrat si diplomat al  Atenei ) astfel :
When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, alarm bells should sound, extreme danger ahead. This is a big insight earned for us by Thucydides. And Thucydides said, famously, it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable. This was the war between Athens and Sparta that basically destroyed classical Greece”.[2]
            In legatura cu imprejurarile acestei focalizari neobisnuite a lumii academice internationale asupra UNEI  problematici de acum 2500 de ani  trebuie sa fie mentionate urmatoarele:
 
1.     Anul 2012 a fost anul unei extraordinare inflamari a relatiilor dintre China si Japonia in legatura cu dosarul apartenentei  insulelor Senkaku ( denumirea chineza:Diaoyu ) din Marea Chinei de Sud.  Practic, insulele, care traditional au apartinut, in Evul Mediu,  Imperiului Chinez, sustinatorii acestei teze producand hartile in consecinta, au fost ocupate de catre Japonia la sfarsitul secolului XIX ca “pamantul nimanui ’ ( terra nullius” ) si socotita parte a propriului  teritoriu national. In 1972, China a aratat ca nu e misiunea  generatiei sale  de atunci, preocupata de alte prioritati, sa se ocupe de dosarul apartenentei insulelor Diaoyu . Tensiunile dintre China si Japonia in acest dosar  intervenite din 2012  au ridicat imediat problema posibilitatii unui razboi intre marile puteri in era post Razboi Rece.

A Chinese surveillance vessel passes a Japanese Coast Guard ship near the contested Senkakuku Islands (Kyodo/Reuters)
 
2.     Chestiunea Senkaku ( Diaoyu ) are o componenta internationala extrem de importanta. Conform aliantei postbelice dintre Japonia si SUA ,  integritatea teritoriului  national japonez intra sub incidenta clauzei de securitate comuna , asadar un eventual razboi chino-japonez ar atrage  si SUA de partea Japoniei . Desi clauza din tratatul bilateral SUA-Japonia este interpretabila, chestiunea din Marea Chinei de Sud si atitudinea Chinei in acest acvatoriu a devenit rapid o chestiune international  in care se vorbea deschis de razboi. Prezent in octombrie 2016 la al 7-lea forum de securitate Xiangshan  de la Beijing, subsemnatul am fost martor la discutarea deschisa a posibilitatii unui razboi in acest acvatoriu in prezenta sefilor apararii  din statele care il flancheaza. Ministrul Apararii, de pilda, al Philipine a spus foarte clar ca, in absenta unor masuri comune  a statelor riverane de evitare a razboiului , acesta este inevitabil.
 
3.      Centenarul Marelui Razboi ( 1924- 1918 ) a dat imbold cercetarilor referitoare la cauzele izbucnirii unui razboi mondial . Chiar Allison , in articolele sale face referiri la modul in care a izbucnit Primul Razboi Mondial: “And yet 100 years on, World War I offers a sobering reminder of man’s capacity for folly. When we say that war is “inconceivable,” is this a statement about what is possible in the world—or only about what our limited minds can conceive? In 1914, few could imagine slaughter on a scale that demanded a new category: world war. When war ended four years later, Europe lay in ruins: the kaiser gone, the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved, the Russian tsar overthrown by the Bolsheviks, France bled for a generation, and England shorn of its youth and treasure. A millennium in which Europe had been the political center of the world came to a crashing halt.”[3]
 
4.     Conceptul ca atare a intrat in limbajul oamenilor politici , americani si chinezi, dovada faptului ca inevitabila  competitia sistemica intre cei doi giganti era evidenta . Astfel, in 2013 , presedintele chinez Xi Jinping a declarat deschis ca “ trebuie sa cooperam  pentru a evita ‘capcana lui Tucidide” , iar in 2015 presedintele Obama a  aratat ca nu crede in acest concept si in faptul ca el se aplica relatiilor chino-americane. Presedintele Trump nu a facut referiri la concept, dar in 2017  a spus ca doreste sa intareasca stransa cooperare cu Beijingul. [4]
 
5.     In aceasta privinta este cruciala informatia pe care Graham Allison o da intr-un articol publicat in ‘New York Times ’ in iunie 2013, inainte de o intalnire in California intre liderii celor doua state:  “China’s leaders have studied the historical record of rising states. A decade ago, the topic for a collective study session by the Politburo was a ‘Historical Investigation of the Development of the World’s Main Powers since the 15th Century.’ As Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore, has noted: ‘In the security arena, the Chinese understand that the U.S. has spent so much more and has built up such advantages that direct challenges would be futile. Not until China has overtaken the U.S. in the development and application of technology can they envisage confronting the U.S. militarily.’”[5]
 
            Intr-un  articol ulterior, publicat in 2015,  Graham Allison a aratat si care sunt cazurile istorice studiate de el , precum si cum s-au finalizat. In tabelul urmator se poate distinge ca din 16 cazuri istorice selectate si studiate, doar patru s-au finalizat pasnic, celelate  esuand in razboi hegemonic.
 
Directia de cercetare deschisa de Allison s-a vadit extrem de fructuoasa. El a lansat si un proiect la Harvard cu aceasta tema , finalizat intr-o carte publicata in 2017.[7]  Deja conceptual lansat de profesorul American facuse o cariera internationala, iar establishmentul politic  american nu a ezitat sa chestioneze rezultatele cercetarii . In cursul audierilor, Allison a rezumat in 10 intrebari interesul legislatorilor americani, dintre care cea mai importanta consider a fi cea dintai:
 “1. What is your assessment of Chinese strategic intentions in the AsiaPacific region, and globally, over the short, medium, and long term? How will China advance those intentions?
            Raspunsul lui Allison a fost urmatorul:
I posed this question two years ago to the individual who was unquestionably the world’s premier China watcher until his death in 2015. Specifically I asked him: ‘are China’s current leaders, including Xi, serious about displacing the US as the predominant power in Asia in the foreseeable future?’ I cannot improve on his answer. Lee Kuan Yew responded: ‘Of course. Why not? How could they not aspire to be number one in Asia and in time the world?’
 Lee foresaw the twenty-first century as a ‘contest for supremacy in Asia.’ China’s leaders see this as what they call a ‘prolonged struggle’ over international order—especially in their neighborhood. This does not mean that Xi and his colleagues want war. Precisely the opposite. Instead, they are attempting to follow Sun Tzu’s maxim: ‘Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle, but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.’[8]
            Media americana observase deja din iunie 2017 interesul deosbit al Casei Albe asupra cercetarilor profesorului Allison. Mai mult chiar, au fost identificate si trasaturi trumpiene in cartea veche de aproape 2500 de ani:  “But Trump might approve of the ancient Greek scholar’s sway over his senior strategists. Thucydides is considered a father of the ‘realist’ school of international relations, which holds that nations act out of pragmatic self-interest with little regard for ideology, values or morality. ‘He was the founder of realpolitik,’ Allison says. This view is distilled in the famous Melian Dialogue, a set of surrender talks that feature the cold-eyed conclusion that right and wrong means nothing in the face of raw strength. ‘In the real world, the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must,’ concludes an Athenian ambassador—a Trumpian statement 2½ millennia before The Donald’s time.[9]           

                        Graham Allison
            O precizare este necesara in acest context. Audierile in Senat ale lui Allison au cuprins si o parte  secreta, conform unor anumite marturii. Ceea ce este public este insa suficient pentru a evidentia faptul ca actuala rivalitate sistemica intre SUA si China a atins un stadiu in care a fost luata in calcul pentru decizie in consecinta in laboratorul decisional al ambelor mari puteri. Adaugam ca - tocmai pentru a observa ca in cartea sa care a determinat audierile la Senatul american, Allison,  a pus un pret deosebit pe cunoscatorii Chinei si le-a citat opiniile avizate. Asa cum a subliniat unul dintre recenzenti, bun cunoscator al dedesubturilor politicii mondiale, generalul Micheal Hyden, fost sef al CIA si al NSA :  “ Allison wisely dwells on the thoughts of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, that island nation’s former benevolent autocrat and an astute observer of China. China was not about to become a democracy, Lee observed, ‘If it were to do so, it would collapse.’ And he was ruthless in critiquing China’s ‘operating system.’ But Lee also conceded that China was becoming ‘the biggest player in the history of the world.’ ” [10]
            Ceea ce vrem sa sublinem prin aceasta precizare este ca establishmentul politic din Washingtona ‘citit’ cum se cuvine cartea lui Allison, ceea ce a determinat si audierea sa in senat cateva luni mai tarziu. Principale directii ale acestei “citiri” :  principala rivalitate sistemica este cea chino-americana , care poate sa se finalizeze in absenta unei atente gestionari intr-un razboi hegemonic; China nu-si poate schimba sistemul politic fara sa riste colapsul; Beijingul este gata sa evite ‘capcana lui Tucidide” , solicitand ceea ce  aspira sa fie, eventual co-hegemon. Deopotriva, establishmentul american este decis sa nu cedeze leadership-ul global 
            O alta precizare necesara este aceea ca liderul Chinei a fost la curent cu cercetarile profesorului american in privinta  ‘ capcanei lui Tucidide”. Avem din aceasta perspective marturia unui recunoscut expert in relatiile international, Gideon Rachman. El a scris urmatoarele  la 30 martie 2017  in “ Financial Times’ : "As Xi Jinping prepares to meet Donald Trump in Florida next week, his staff might do well to get hold of an advance copy of an important new book by Graham Allison on US-Chinese relations — which bears the doom-laden title Destined for War. The Chinese president is already familiar with the work of Allison, a professor of government at Harvard. In November 2013, I attended a meeting with President Xi in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, where he told a group of western visitors: ‘We must all work together to avoid Thucydides’s trap’ .  “ [11] 
Se poate spune ca privind retrospectiv, in laboratorul decizional ambelor mari puteri, China si SUA, cercetarea lui Graham Allison a fost de la inceput perceputa ca extrem de serioasa; putem adauga ca insistenta cu care a fost mentionat acest concept in sferele inalte ale puterii din ambele state a jucat si rolul unui colectiv sentiment de ‘wishful thinking’ care a influentat enorm deciziile luate ulterior atat la Washington, cat si la Beijing.
 
1 aprilie 2020
 
 
[1] Graham Allison, Thucydides’ Trap Has Been Sprung in the Pacific, in ” Financial Times “ ,
August 21, 2012-  https://www.ft.com/content/5d695b5a-ead3-11e1-984b-00144feab49a
                 
[2]  Apud: Alan Greeley Misenheimer, Thucydides’ Other “Traps” The United States, China, and the Prospect of “Inevitable” War, National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2019-p.1-https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/casestudies/nwc_casestudy-3.pdf?ver=2019-06-04-144701-043
 
[3] Graham Allison, The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?,  September 24, 2015- https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/thucydides-trap-are-us-and-china-headed-war
[4] Ling Shengli , Lv Huiyi ,  Why Are China and the U.S. Not Destined to Fall into the “Thucydides’ Trap”?- China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2018 , p.498-https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1142/S2377740018500288- prima mentiune este in 2013 , noiembrie, cum scrie G. Rachman- vezi mai departe nota 11- si nu 2014 , cum scriu autorii chinezi
[5] Graham T. Allison Jr. , Obama and Xi Must Think Broadly to Avoid a Classic Trap , in “ New York Times” , June 6, 2013- https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/opinion/obama-and-xi-must-think-broadly-to-avoid-a-classic-trap.html
 
[6] Idem  - The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?-  Tezele fundamentale ale articolului : “The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s Trap. The Greek historian’s metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. /…/When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part not just of the challenger but also the challenged. Based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not. Moreover, current underestimations and misapprehensions of the hazards inherent in the U.S.-China relationship contribute greatly to those hazards. A risk associated with Thucydides’s Trap is that business as usual—not just an unexpected, extraordinary event—can trigger large-scale conflict. When a rising power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained, like the assassination of an archduke in 1914, can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen.”                  
[7] Graham Allison, Destined for war: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? (New
York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017)
[8] Opening  Statement by dr. Graham T. Allison  before the USA Senate Foreign Relations Sucommittee on East Asia , the Pacific, and Cybersecurity Policy at the Hearing Convened to Discuss ‘ American Leadership in the Asia Pacific, Part 4: The View from Beijing’- November 14, 2017  https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417_Allison_Testimony.pdf. O alta intrebare importanta a fost : “How does the Chinese leadership view the United States and its role in the region and the world?” Raspunsul a fost deopotriva, in linie cu cel citat anterior: “In 2014, former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and U.S. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft each came back from separate, extensive conversations with Chinese leaders with identical views of what they call the striking ‘consensus’ in the Chinese leadership. According to both statesmen, China’s leaders believe that America’s grand strategy for dealing with China involves five ‘to’s’: to isolate China, to contain China, to diminish China, to internally divide China, and to sabotage China’s leadership. As Rudd explained, these convictions ‘derive from a Chinese conclusion that the US has not, and never will, accept the fundamental political legitimacy of the Chinese administration because it is not a liberal democracy.’ Moreover, according to Rudd, this is based on ‘a deeply held, deeply ‘realist’ Chinese conclusion that the US will never willingly concede its status as the preeminent regional and global power, and will do everything within its power to retain that position.’ Or, as Henry Kissinger says plainly, every Chinese leader he has met believes that America’s strategy is to ‘contain’ China  “
 
[9] Michael Crowley ,Why the White House Is Reading Greek History The Trump team is obsessing over Thucydides, the ancient historian who wrote a seminal tract on war.  ‘Politico’ June 21, 2017 https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/21/why-the-white-house-is-reading-greek-history-215287
 
[10]  General Michael Hyden, China: The Greatest Disruptive Force Today.  in ‘ Cipher Brief’ , June 1, 2017- https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column/state-of-play/china-the-greatest-disruptive-force-today
                 
[11]  Gideon Rachman, Destined for war? China, America and the Thucydides trap, ‘Financial Times’ March 30, 2017 https://www.ft.com/content/0e1ac020-1490-11e7-b0c1-37e417ee6c76 via  https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/destined-war-china-america-and-thucydides-trap Rachman  a continuat: “The phrase, a reference to the ancient Greek historian’s observations about the war between Sparta and Athens in the fifth century BC, was coined by Allison to describe the dangers of a period in which an established great power is challenged by a rising power. Allison, the author of a classic study of the Cuban missile crisis, calculates that in 12 out of 16 such cases, the rivalry has ended in open conflict. This time, he argues, may be no different: ‘China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war — unless both parties take difficult and painful actions to avert it.’”

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