RAPORT DIN TRANSEE - 6 | publicatii - Politica La Est
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RAPORT DIN TRANSEE - 6

28 martie 2020                                   
Mihail E. Ionescu
 
                 Cand presedintele Frantei, E. Macron,  a utilizat de opt ori  cuvantul “razboi” in alocutiunea sa de avertizare a natiunii  ( 16 martie ) fata de pericolul grav al Covid -19 , multi  s-au intrebat:  cu cine suntem in razboi  ?  Desi Macron nominalizase repetat inamicul. Decriptarea ‘metaforei’  lui Macron  nu era defel dificila. Mai ales ca el folosise  in alocutiunea sa si alte fraze cheie , care aduceau aminte de Primul Razboi Mondial. Un exemplu in acest sens, compararea personalului sistemului national sanitar actual  cu militarii francezi ai  Marelui Razboi, reluand exact cuvintele sefului Frantei de atunci, George Clemenceau  fata de luptatorii  din transee: “Ils ont des droits sur nous.”. Acest lucru a fost observat abia mai apoi, cand au avut loc reuniuni ale Consiliului European, iar Germania ( alaturi de Austria si Olanda, parca si Finlanda, ratacita intre ele, ) s-a opus mutualizarii pierderilor uriase provocate de actuala criza la nivelul UE   ( 26 martie 2020 ). Adica, atunci cand UE se afla practic, in intregimea sa,  in ‘razboi’.
 Ne aducem aminte de acest lucru si cand observam ca alti actori ai sistemului international de state au luat masuri pregatitoare de razboi cu mult inainte ca altii - refer la micii actori , totdeauna gata sa plateasca pentru conflictele celor mari sistemici - care nu au realizat numaidecat ce insemnatate au cuvintele utilizate de cei mari.

                 Aici intervine o chestiune de mare importanta, anume responsabilitatea celor aflati in inalte functii de raspundere in Europa ( UE indeosebi)  de a fi  esuat in a lua aminte ca si tarile lor sunt  implicate   intr-un  astfel de razboi , asadar ca toate natiunile vor fi atrase in el  .  Vina acestor responsabili  este de o gravitate extrema . Cu deosebire atunci   cand au esuat sa faca cele necesare fara sa fi avut ( sau avand )  abilitare constitutionala si  mai ales morala, ci dimpotriva, aveau din belsug asemenea motivatii sa intreprinda totul pentru a face pregatirile necesare. Asadar atunci cand au inselat - indiferent unde - increderea celor care  i-au votat ,  din nepricepere ( care va fi desigur invocata la ceasul socotelilor )  sau poate astfel, intelegand  prin asta  jocuri subtile de ordin geopolitic. La vremea raspunderilor pentru mii de morti nevinovati, asemenea calcule si  numeroase intrebari  vor avea importanta lor si consecintele inevitabile pe termen lung in registrul geopolitic, probabil ostilizand natiuni intregi fata de altele, dand astfel lovituri puternice procesului globalizarii si intarind curentul catre suprematia statului-natiune . Sa vedem , pe surse de necontestat, cum s-au pregatit natiuni europene mari  pentru acest razboi, mai ales de cand au purces sa initieze un asemenea proces ?

                  Mai intai,  Marea Britanie, care abia recent a parasit Uniunea Europeana  ( 31 ianuarie 2020 ) dupa ce au pus capat  unui impovarator dosar  dirijat de la Londra de a raspunde democratic – din motive care tin de propria mare strategie a UK - rezultatelor referendumului din iunie 2016 ?
16 hours ago, 28 tweets, 4 min read
Given allegations about early UK response to Covid-19 I’ve been looking at minutes of the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG). This to the main Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE). The minutes can be found here app.box.com/s/3lkcbxepqixk…
 
                   Its chaired by Peter Horby of Oxford University. Professor Neill Ferguson of Imperial among its members. Clearly not the only advisory group meeting and not where decisions are taken but it has a lot of academic firepower and addresses some big question for the government.2/n
Before this crisis its previous meeting had been in June 2019 when it discussed a variety of influenzas. It first met on this crisis on 13 January / our colored bolds /and has since met regularly. The last published minutes are of a sub-group that met on 4 March 3/n
For anyone who thinks it was all obvious in January and February reading these minutes is a sobering experience. What comes over is the real uncertainty about what could be foretold from the Chinese experience and the ease with which the disease could be transmitted.4/n
The 13 January meeting, called at the request of DHSC/  Department
of Health&Social Care/, discussed the ‘Wuhan Novel Coronavirus’. The latest information from China was of 41 cases and one death
. 5/n
The World Health Organization (WHO) had reported that there had been no new cases reported since 3 January. This illustrates the unfortunate role played by WHO at this time in passing on official Chinese complacency. 6/n
Though members were keen for more diagnostic information, NERVTAG concluded on available evidence that ‘the novel virus does not look to be very transmissible’. The risk level internationally was put as ‘low/moderate’. Travel advice was endorsed for people visiting Wuhan. 7/n
By 21 January there were now 279 cases in mainland China with another 4 outside the country. There had been six deaths. There was no doubt of human-to-human transmission. 8/n
The first modelling from the Imperial College team estimated that there had been up to 2,500 cases in Wuhan but they still new little about the role of animals in transmission, infectiousness in relation to symptom onset, and whether asymptomatic patients were infectious.9/n
Risk of disease having wide impact was raised to moderate although the risk to UK still assessed as low. Discussion was largely about flights from Wuhan and whether people should be screened when leaving or asked to confirm had no symptoms (they were screened on departure). 8/n
sorry that 10/n
The DHSC asked if the advice would change with multiple outbreaks in Chinese cities. The response was that in those circumstances ‘it was unlikely that transmission to the UK could be prevented’. At best it could be delayed. 11/n
Messages were to be sent out to raise awareness of the issue in the health service. 12/n
A week later, 28 January, the virus had spread through China, and the first case had reached Europe (Germany). 13/n
There was evidence of transmission by asymptomatic individuals and that the virus was not behaving the same way as SARS in 2003. The case numbers appeared to be doubling every three to four days.14/n
The issues now being discussed in addition to travel advice (direct flights from Wuhan had stopped five days earlier) were about face masks and PPE. 15/n
Two days later, 30 January, NERVTAG met again. They now agreed on a clinical definition (cough, fever and shortness of breath) and began to discuss possible treatments and tests. 16/n
On 3 February they approved formal recommendations on hygiene and face masks and noted that social distancing might need to be considered. 17/n
By 21 February (six weeks ago) the situation was recognised to be more serious. China had shifted from counting cases that had been laboratory confirmed as well as those clinically diagnosed. 18/n
The Chinese number now was 75,465 cases with 2,236 fatalities. There were now 1,259 cases outside China with 11 fatalities (of which2 had been on the cruise ship Diamond Princess). 19/n
DHSC asked for modelling of the Reasonable Worst Case – what population could be infected, what proportion would be symptomatic, how many would require hospital care and respiratory support. 20/n
The Imperial Group undertaking this were still hampered by limited information from China. If children contributed to transmission up to 80 % of population would get infected in absence of intervention. 21/n
Evidence that 40 % cases were asymptomatic, case fatality rate outside of mainland China was 2-4% though in China much higher, possibly because only severe cases detected, perhaps 5% of the total. Older people were more vulnerable: younger people could get infected. 22/n
Surprisingly the risk assessment for the UK population was still moderate, although there was now a push for it to be moved to high. 23/n
At this time there were nine cases in the UK with no deaths, with 12 cases in France, and one death, an 80-year-old Chinese tourist. In Italy, whose terrible experience would soon transform attitudes, there were then 21 cases with the first death that day. 24/n
This group was one of number feeding into policy-making. Looking at its deliberations provides a reminder of how the seriousness of this pandemic only gradually came to be appreciated and how the national effort was hampered by uncertainty about the information from China. 25/n
We may wish that they had known then what we know now but they didn’t. My main point is that where the evidence is available we should at least examine it before passing judgement on those who were grappling with this crisis in that faraway time, a few weeks ago. End
Sorry about link. This is NERVTAG site
 New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory GroupThe New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG) advises the government on the threat posed by new and emerging respiratory
viruses.https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/new-and-emerging-respiratory-virus-threats-advisory-group”[1]
 
Retineti aceste date, care jaloneaza sfaturile date de acest organism de  studiu, analiza si control existent in Marea Britanie  decidentilor politici: 13 ianuarie si 21 februarie. La aceasta ultima data au fost luate primele masuri de preventive de masa  a  pandemiei in UK. Problematica discutata aici este de o importanta extrema in stabilirea responsabilitatilor la nivel de UE si deopotriva national. Circumstantele specifice urmeaza sa fie separat evaluate de responsabili nationali numiti in acest scop si care vor trebui sa probeze masurile luate , cu datele si amanuntele necesare, pentru stabilirea raspunderilor . In UK constatam ca deja procesul a inceput.
Pe continent, un  alt actor important , Germania, are aceeasi atitudine fata de pandemia care pandeste din China.  Masurile care sunt luate ca preventive, chiar intrec cele gandite in UK, din perspectiva timpului. Astfel ca chiar te intrebi: sunt germanii atat de prevazatori totdeauna sau stiu ceva in acest joc complicat, in care geopolitica se amesteca cu protejara sanatatii si decide , intelligent,  panda de primejdie si masuri de luat:
 
“Why Germany's Coronavirus Death Rate Is Far Lower Than In Other Countries
March 25, 202012:03 PM ET
 
Young people gather in the Volkspark am Friedrichshain in Berlin on March 18. Germany's fatality rate so far — just 0.5% — is the world's lowest, by a long shot.
As confirmed cases of the coronavirus in Germany soared past 10,000 last week, hundreds of Berliners crowded Volkspark am Friedrichshain to play soccer and basketball, and to let their kids loose on the park's many jungle gyms.
The conditions seemed ideal for the spread of a virus that has killed thousands. Indeed, as of Wednesday, Germany had the fifth-highest number of cases.
Yet Germany's fatality rate so far — just 0.5% — is the world's lowest, by a long shot.
"I believe that we are just testing much more than in other countries, and we are detecting our outbreak early," said Christian Drosten, director of the institute of virology at Berlin's Charité hospital.
As Europe has become the epicenter of the global coronavirus pandemic, Italy's fatality rate hovers around 10%. France's is around 5%. Yet Germany's fatality rate from COVID-19 has remained remarkably low since cases started showing up there more than a month ago. As of March 25, there were 175 deaths and 34,055 cases.
Drosten, whose team of researchers developed the first COVID-19 test used in the public domain, said Germany's low fatality rate is because of his country's ability to test early and often. He estimates Germany has been testing around 120,000 people a week for COVID-19 during the month long period from late February to now, when it's reached epidemic proportions in the country, the most extensive testing regimen in the world.
And that means Germany is more likely to have a lower number of undetected cases than other countries where testing is less prevalent, which raises the question: Why is Germany testing so much
 
 
The Coronavirus Crisis
 
‘We have a culture here in Germany that is actually not supporting a centralized diagnostic system,’ said Drosten, ‘so Germany does not have a public health laboratory that would restrict other labs from doing the tests. So we had an open market from the beginning.’
In other words, Germany's equivalent to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention — the Robert Koch Institute — makes recommendations but does not call the shots on testing for the entire country. Germany's 16 federal states make their own decisions on coronavirus testing because each of them is responsible for their own health care systems.
When Drosten's university medical center developed what became the test recommended by the World Health Organization, they rolled these tests out to their colleagues throughout Germany in January.
‘And they of course rolled this out to labs they know in the periphery and to hospital labs in the area where they are situated,’ Drosten said. ‘This created a situation where, let's say, by the beginning or middle of February, testing was already in place, broadly.’
Drosten said that has meant quicker, earlier and more widespread testing for COVID-19 in Germany than in other countries.
Lothar Wieler, head of the Robert Koch Institute, Germany's federal agency responsible for disease control and prevention, said at a news conference last week that Germany's testing infrastructure means authorities have a more accurate read of confirmed cases of the virus.
‘We don't know exactly how many unknown cases there are, but we estimate that this unknown number is not very high,’ Wieler said. ‘The reason is simple. We issued recommendations in mid-January about who should be tested and who shouldn't be tested.’
But some Berlin residents aren't as confident as Wieler. Nizana Nizzi Brautmann said she was worried when a teacher at her son's school tested positive for COVID-19 and a day later she and her son woke up with fevers and persistent coughing. She said she couldn't get through to Berlin's coronavirus hotline, which was continuously busy.
She finally got through to the city's emergency medical service number, ‘and I told her I think we need to be checked because we have some symptoms,’ Brautmann recalled. ‘The lady was just saying, 'We make no tests here. I can't help you. I would advise you to stay home and drink tea.'
When she finally was able to speak to a doctor on the phone, the doctor told her to wait in line outside a local hospital to get tested, but she didn't have a mask for her or her son, and she didn't want to infect others in line, so she stayed home. She and her son are now in good health, but she said the episode left her wondering how prepared German society is for this pandemic.
Drosten said such experiences are probably an exception, not the rule.
‘I know the diagnostics community in Germany a bit,’ Drosten said. ‘My feeling is that actually the supply of tests is still good. And of course, our epidemic is now also very much up-ramping and we will lose track here, too.’
Drosten said the growing number of cases in Germany will soon exceed testing capacities. But for the time being, he thinks the country has had a robust response to the coronavirus pandemic. He's most worried about countries in Africa that aren't well set up for this — countries that, once the crisis comes to them, will find it more difficult to flatten the curve.”[2]
 
                  Este bine a privim putin ininteriorul laboratorului de studiu si  decizie , pentru a avea imaginea atat a structurilor implicate , cat , macar partial, a procesului in sine , pana la ‘sfaturile’ date guvernului de specialisti:
In other words, we are interacting with Covid, much as would be the case between two opposing armies or in a fight between jihadis and counter-terrorist forces. As I write, one can already describe some of the terms of the strategic debate: Do we ride this one through like we had to do with the Spanish flu of 1918-19, culling the herd so that we eventually build up so-called herd (aka group)immunity, as has been suggested by Prime Ministers Boris Johnson and Mark Rutte, accepting the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands on the battlefield?*[3] Or do we attempt to hold back the enemy through quarantines and so-called social distancing in the hope of holding out until the cavalry of vaccines and cures arrives? When we choose, as most of our countries do, the latter strategy, the tempo of war with its campaigns and operations falls into place: the authorities activate command posts (aka as crisis centers), the French hospital system is put on a war footing (le plan blanc), choices are made between mass mobilization measures (cordoning off the entire Schengen area) and flexible response (closing schools but not banks), and for the duration (to use an English wartime expression) our businesses become part of a command economy. As in war, different plans are made at the operative level. Some working, such as early, systematic testing; or early and brutal measures to slow the virus’s spread. Some fail such as over-selective testing; under ambitious and belated holding operations.
Unsurprisingly, the tools used in advance planning as in the current crisis management are those initially devised to deal with warlike contingencies: the well-known British crisis-management center COBRA (Cabinet Office Building Room A) was first set up to deal with the Irish Republican Army. Its French equivalent, CIC (Centre interministériel de Crise), was created in 2009 as a consequence of a proposal made in a White Paper on Terrorism in 2005 with its implementation being mandated in our National Security and Defence White Paper in 2008. Planning and exercising for a possible interhuman bird-flu pandemic in 2004-2006 was an integral part of that process, which demonstrates that even at the concept phase, mass terrorism and health crises were seen as belonging to the same conceptual universe. I was intimately involved in this process and can thus ensure that this is not an ex post facto rationalization of what we are witnessing semantically and practically today.[4]
 
Trebuie sa ne intrebam si cand era deja prea tarziu pentru a fi luate masurile pregatitoare in eventualitatea in care razboiul va cuprinde in valvataile sale  intreaga omenire. Desigur, poate fi luata ca data terminus chiar decizia WHO de a declara Covid-19 ca fiind pandemie, lucru intamplat miercuri,  11 martie 2020:
The World Health Organization has declared the new coronavirus outbreak a global pandemic.
WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus noted on Wednesday thatin the past two weeks, the number of cases of COVID-19 outside China has increased 13-fold, and the number of affected countries has tripled.
He saidIn the days and weeks ahead we expect to see the number of cases, the number of deaths, and the number of affected countries climb even higher.’
He said the world health watchdog isdeeply concerned both by the alarming levels of spread and severity and by the alarming levels of inaction.’
The WHO chief said therefore COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic.
At the same time, Tedros said 90 percent of those infected are either in China, South Korea, Iran or Italy, and added that all nations can change the course of the pandemic,if countries detect, test, treat, isolate, trace and mobilize their people’ ."[5]

WHO declares COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic
 
Exista insa o alta data , care trebuie luata in considerare atunci cand putem stabili data ultima in care puteau fi luate masuri adecvate in Europa sau aiurea pe planeta – pentru pregatirea natiunilor/statelor pentru ‘razboi’. Anume , atunci cand China a declarat propria victorie in ‘razboi’- fie ca a fost asa sau nu- si a lansat propria orientare geopolitica de a tinti conducerea sistemica . Iata ce scrie in aceasta privinta un articol din ‘ Foreign Affairs’ :
In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the novel coronavirus, which causes the disease now referred to as COVID-19, the missteps of Chinese leaders cast a pall on their country’s global standing. The virus was first detected in November 2019 in the city of Wuhan, but officials didn’t disclose it for months and even punished the doctors who first reported it, squandering precious time and delaying by at least five weeks measures that would educate the public, halt travel, and enable widespread testing. Even as the full scale of the crisis emerged, Beijing tightly controlled information, shunned assistance from the CDC, limited World Health Organization travel to Wuhan, likely undercounted infections and deaths, and repeatedly altered the criteria for registering new COVID-19 cases—perhaps in a deliberate effort to manipulate the official number of cases.
As the crisis worsened through January and February, some observers speculated that the coronavirus might even undermine the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. It was called China’s ‘Chernobyl’; Dr. Li Wenliang—the young whistleblower silenced by the government who later succumbed to complications from the COVID-19—was likened to the Tiananmen Square ‘tank man.’
Yet by early March, China was claiming victory. Mass quarantines, a halt to travel, and a complete shutdown of most daily life nationwide were credited with having stemmed the tide; official statistics, such as they are, reported that daily new cases had fallen into the single digits in mid-March from the hundreds in early February. In a surprise to most observers, Chinese leader Xi Jinping—who had been uncharacteristically quiet in the first weeks—began to put himself squarely at the center of the response. This month, he personally visited Wuhan.

xi_0
Even though life in China has yet to return to normal (and despite continuing questions over the accuracy of China’s statistics), Beijing is working to turn these early signs of success into a larger narrative to broadcast to the rest of the world—one that makes China the essential player in a coming global recovery while airbrushing away its earlier mismanagement of the crisis. 
Beijing is working to turn early signs of success into a larger narrative to broadcast to the rest of the world.” [6]
            Asadar, la inceputul lui martie (‘ early March’ ) 2020, China isi declara victoria in razboi si a declansat propria naratiune oprivind acest razboi, larg rtaspandita de atunci pe planeta. Dar evident, ca “ early March” sau “ 11 martie” pot fi doar date de control pentru opinia publica , nicidecum pentru responsabili nationali , care au a raspunde pentru pregatirea propriilor natiuni sa faca fata acestui razboi pustiitor.
 
[3]*” Covid -19’s threshold for achieving herd immunity is between 60 and 70% of the total population. With a mortality rate of 0.7% of the infected population, this implies some 250 000 fatalities in a country of 60 million inhabitants  (60 M × 60%=36 M x 0.7%=circa 250 000 fatalities)”.
[4] François Heisbourg ,COVID-19 at war: between metaphor and reality, Mar 23, 2020      https://aspeniaonline.it/covid-19-at-war-between-metaphor-and-reality/
 
[5] WHO declares COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic, Wednesday, March 11, 20:46-https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20200312_08/
 
[6] Kurt M. Campbell ,Rush Doshi ,The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global OrderChina Is Maneuvering for International Leadership as the United States Falters , March 18, 2020 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order
 

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