FLASH 1 Martie 2015 | publicatii - Politica La Est
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FLASH 1 Martie 2015

FLASH  1  – Martie 2015
 
       1. UCRAINA: PIATRA DE INCERCARE A RELATIILOR USA- RUSIA  Este limpede ca principala problema a relatiilor internationale este  azi starea raporturilor intre Rusia si Occident, in mod special SUA. Anexarea Crimeei de Rusia acum 1 an de zile, precum si amestecul brutal al acesteia in destabilizarea statului vecin prin sprijinirea separatismului rusofon din Donbas - luptele de aici au facut deja cca. 6 ooo de morti ( cifra oficiala, pentru ca estimatii neoficiale se ‘urca’ spre 50 000 )- a determinat un raspuns ferm al Occidentului-sanctiuni economice care tind sa provoaca mari neajunsuri economiei rusesti-,fara insa a se ajunge la o solutie. Criza ucraineana are inca potentialul de a deveni , in intregimea ei , un “protracted conflict” cu urmari serioase asupra structurii de securittate din Europa si asupra ordinei globale. Intelegerea in format “Normandia” de la Minsk ( 12 februarie 2015 ) care a statuat o incetare a focului in Estul Ucrainei nu da semne de a avea efectele asteptate asupra stabilizarii situatiei , mai mult , in ultima vreme , s-au inmultit semnele deteriorarii acesteia. Astfel, lideri militari NATO au mentionat repetat ca Rusia pregateste o noua ofensiva in Est, iar in consecinta alianta a luat masurile necesare pentru a preintampina eventuala extinderea a acesteia asupra unui membru al ei ( dislocarea unei brigazi si vehicule blindate americane in Letonia, exercitii militare navale in Marea Neagra ). Acestor masuri li s-a raspuns de catre  Rusia si astfel este posibila intrarea intr-o spirala a escaladarii care poate scapa de sub control. Iata de ce a devenit de mare importanta sa fie identificate caile potrivite pentru detensionarea situatiei din Estul Europei.

        Dincolo de solutiile gandite si aplicate in cancelariile actorilor implicati, universitarii si membrii think-tank-urilor desfasoara la randu-le o activitate febrila. La un recent simpozion , gazduit de Universitatea Tufts din SUA, doi cunoscuti experti rusi au discutat pe larg starea actuala a relatiilor dintre Rusia si SUA si ce trebuie facut pentru a identifica o solutie crizei ucrainene. Acesti experti-Robert Lengvold si Dmitri Trenin- au exprimat puncte de vedere rezumate intr-un articol intitulat Legvold and Trenin: How to fix the US-Russian relationship, semnat Ekaterina Zabrovskaya si publicat pe site-ul fundatiei Carnegie. Dezbaterea , intinsa pe durata a patru zile, a implicat pe langa cei doi experti rusi, alti cunoscatori ai situatiei de securitate din Europa din mediul universitar american.  Dmitri Trenin a insistat asupra faptului ca practic cele doua parti- Rusia si SUA – sunt in confruntare:” We are in confrontation. The bad thing about this confrontation is that it’s held very much on the Russian side. I don’t think that the U.S. believes that this is a confrontation with Russia. For a lot of people, Russia is a threat but not a big one. As [U.S. President Barack] Obama said, something between Ebola and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria].” Pentru a fi clara ce poate insemna aceasta cnfruntare, Lengvold precizeaza ca situatia actuala este similara Razboiului Rece:“ Now there is a symmetry, Dmitri. Each country has defined the other side as an adversary. This is determining our policies more than anything else in the past and will affect the way in which we redesign NATO to deal with Russia as a threat.” Diferenta –arata Trenin – fata de situatia din Razboiul Rece este insa una extrem de importanta si ingrijoratoare:“In the Cold War you could compromise with [Soviet leaders Joseph] Stalin,  [Leonid] Brezhnev, and [Nikita] Khrushchev. Compromising with [Russia President Vladimir] Putin is somehow not acceptable.” Acelasi expert rus - de care ma leaga personal o prietenie masurata in ani- considera ca: “ The best way to make sure that the there is no longer a confrontation between two powers is to integrate the power that found itself a difficult situation into a wider system that it would feel comfortable with.This was done to France a couple of years after the Napoleonic wars and to West Germany after the Second World War. That was not done to Germany after the First World War.For a number of reasons people didn’t think that Russia was worth spending too much money, capital, energy to make it a solid partner within an integrated system.The integrated system that the Russians wanted was supposed to be a security system.One good reason was that people were not sure that Russia would play by the rules if integrated into this system.Whatever we can say about alliances that the U.S. leads, whatever you think about Russia it has never so far recognized a leader to itself in the outside world.That’s where I see a fundamental problem.” Daca este asa, si probabil ca asa este, atunci tot ceea ce putem spera este ca actuala situatie sa nu se dezvolte pe “ scenariul cel mai rau “. Iar din aceasta perspectiva, pentru a evita acest scenariu, prin identificarea de solutii de compromis , sprijinul pe care expertii il pot da decidentilor este semnificativ. Asa cum afirma R. Lengvold:In terms of Dmitri’s pessimism, I think in the near term the likelihood of either side backing down from its current position and taking significant steps to move off the road we are on is very unlikely.Not the least because in the U.S. the pressure in the media and Congress is in the other direction even if the administration was willing to go in a more constructive direction.I am not optimistic at the moment either. But I do think it is time in these circumstances when universities and research organizations need to begin doing something.” ( vezi:Lengvold and Trenin: Now to fix the US-Russian relationship, Mar.7, 2015, Ekaterina  Zabrovskaya, http://www.russia-direct.org/qa/legvold-and-trenin-how-fix-us-russian-relationship -  )
 
       2.  KRUGMAN vs DELONG    Acordul SUA-Europa in domeniul economic (TTIP ) nu ocupa un loc important in atentia expertilor din Romania, concentrati mai ales pe problematici geopolitice de mari dimensiuni legate de evolutia crizei ucrainene. Chiar daca , tocmai din aceasta perspectiva , numitul acord ar trebui sa fie in raza lor de vizibilitate pentru a le intregi analiza, situatia nu este deloc asa. Daca aceasta lacuna analitica se datoreaza perceptiei ca SUA se departeaza de Europa de Est ( ceea ce nu este adevarat ) sau sentimentului ca Germania, ca lider al UE , are anumite aprehensiuni fata de TTIP si deci soarta acestuia este in “mana celor mari” este greu de evaluat.
       SUA este implicata concomitent in negocierea a doua acorduri insa. In afara celui cu Europa , Washingtonul negociaza si un acord de parteneriat cu Asia , iar nu de putine ori cele doua sunt prezentate ca fiind utilizate pentru a defini orientarea prioritara a SUA din perspectiva geopolitica globala. Fara a impartasi o asemenea evaluare , tindem sa credem ca “Pax Americana” este intemeiata tocmai pe aceasta geometrie planetara a acordurilor de parteneriat ale unei mari puteri situata la ambele oceane- Atlantic si Pacific. Dar, acordul  cu  Pacificul  atrage din ce in ce mai multe “voci” din SUA care ii masoara importanta , practicabilitatea si , deopotriva, eficienta si deci sansele de reusita. Intre ele, va prezentam doua de mare calibru: Paul Krugman si Bradford Delong. Iata ce spun ele:
       Paul Krugman a publicat recent un articol in NYT consacrat subiectului TPP ( Tran- Pacific Partnership )  in care isi exprima propria opinie ( TPP at the NABE, NYT, March 11, 2015 ). La 10 martie , Krugman a prezentat opiniile sale la NABE ( National Association of Business Economists) , iar articolul face trimitere la slide-urile utilizate in cursul expunerii sale. Krugman afirma ca “I’m thumbs down. I don’t think the proposal is likely to be the terrible, worker-destroying pact some progressives assert, but it doesn’t look like a good thing either for the world or for the United States, and you have to wonder why the Obama administration, in particular, would consider devoting any political capital to getting this through. “ Krugman face si afirmatii care contrariaza, dar stie desigur ce spune : “The first thing you need to know is that almost everyone exaggerates the importance of trade policy. In part, I believe, this reflects globaloney: talking about international trade
sounds glamorous and forward-thinking, so everyone wants to make that the
centerpiece of their remarks.”; “One particular misuse of the yay-free-trade
sentiment is the persistent effort to make protectionism a cause of economic
slumps, and trade liberalization a route to recovery.” Este adevarat ca pentru a dovedi ultima afirmatie, des utilizata de economisti ca “solutie miraculoasa a refacerii economice “, premiantul Nobel utilizeaza doua exemple, intre care cel din urma arata si aprecierea sa pentru performanta a ceea ce este azi UE:
”  I’ve estimated that “hyperglobalization” – the expansion of world trade to unprecedented levels since 1990 – has added about 5 percent to world incomes; but that’s the combination of everything: containerization, drastic trade liberalization in developing countries, the internet. A better model might be Europe’s Single Market Act, which the European Commission now estimates added 1.8 percent to real incomes; but Eichengreen and Boltho suggest that about half of that reflects policy changes that would have happened anyway. And Europe, which has a compact geography and the kind of shared institutions and culture (and transparency) that make access doable, is surely a better case than the diverse, sprawling group of countries involved in TPP “.
          Iar pentru definirea pozitiei lui Krugman, cred ca nimerit este sa listam ultimul slide al prezentarii sale la NABE:
            “So why is TPP such a priority? (#1 on USCOC agenda)
          Intellectual property:leaked text suggests very strong,
          even draconian IP regime on copyright, patents,pharma etc.
       Three questions:
          1. Is this a progrowth agenda?
          2. Is it in US interests?
          3. Is it something this administration should prioritize?”

Raspunsul lui Brad Delong incepe astfel : “It is foolish to debate whether a trade agreement that has not yet been negotiated is a good idea and should be ratified.Such a debate should properly begin only once there is something to analyze.But here we are, so…A few words about benefits from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, should it be successfully negotiated, in response to Paul Krugman://  ( vezi : The Debate Over the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Focus , Marh 11, 2015 -http://equitablegrowth.org/2015/03/11/debate-trans-pacific-partnership-focus/ )
 
          3. ARMATA EUROPEANA VAZUTA DE UN EUROSCEPTIC  Presedintele Comisiei Europene ,Jean Claude Juncker,  a chemat , acum 10 zile, la construirea unei armate europene pentru  ca astfel  statele organizatiei sa faca fata challenge-urilor strategice ale secolului XXI. Evident ca premierul “guvernului european” a avut in minte cu aceasta propunere ceea ce s-a intamplat si are loc acum in Ucraina, unde Rusia a anexat Crimeea si destabilizeaza estul tarii. UE trebuie- a aratat Juncker- sa se doteze cu necesara credibilitate pentru ca Common Foreign and Security Policy ( CFSP ) sa dobandeasca  consistenta.  Eurosceptic declarat, dar deopotriva un strateg eminent, dornic sa vada Europa manifestandu-se ca actor global, Julien Lindley-French scrie pe blogul sau la 11 martie 2015:
JC is clearly employing a classic Euro-Federalist tactic known in the trade as neo-functionalism. This is where external crises are exploited politically by federalists to wrest power from the member-states in the name of efficiency with the aim of creating an EU super-state by dismantling the state step-by-step.  And yet for all that JC might have a point, although as per usual for all the wrong reasons.  If Europeans are to balance strategy, affordability, military capability, but above all credibility, they either spend more, integrate more, or find a credible balance between the two. Indeed, Russian military adventurism has clearly been encouraged by European military weakness and the appeasement of reality it implies.” French reaminteste ca nu este prima data cand o asemenea idée razbate in Europa, precedentul fiind creat tot de amenintarea rusa:” With the Korean War straining US forces and with over 300 Soviet divisions facing NATO, the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty was signed on 9 May, 1952.  The Treaty called for the creation of a European military force overseen by a European Commission.  Moreover, on 10th September, 1952, it was agreed by the then six signatory states to move towards a European Political Community (EPC), which in time became CFSP.  Indeed, on 15th December, 1952 then West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer said that a common defence policy without a common foreign policy would not work.  Roll on 63 years and the issues are not that different.  US forces are stretched thin the world-over, Russia poses a resurgent military threat to both NATO and the EU, and Europe is just beginning to emerge from a financial cataclysm. “  Dar, responsabilul european, in conceptia lui French,  nu face necesara distictie intre apararea colectiva si apararea comuna, astfel incat propunerea lui este sortita , ca si precedenta din 1952, unui esec . El explica: “However, behind the apparent logic of JC’s call (which is not at all new) is the same divide that ultimately killed the EDC – collective defence versus common defence.  Collective defence is a gathering of like-minded nation-states that decide collectively over the use of force, i.e. NATO. It is not efficient, rarely fully effective, but it is legitimate because the forces involved come from national members and remain under national control. Common defence means, implies, and would require a common government.  Indeed, one could not have an EU Army without a common government and any attempt to create some form of hybrid governance would probably mean force could only ever be used in absolute extremis.  To put it bluntly, who would send my fellow-Sheffielder to his or her death who was part of such a force?  Without an EU government such a force would look pretty but in effect be useless – much like the euphemistically-named EU Battle Groups. “  El arata ca , pe de o parte, statele UE continua sa reduca cheltuielile lor militare, pe de alta parte impartasesc sentimentul ca SUA ( prin NATO ) sunt chemate sa reprezinte necesarul hardpower pentru Europa. Deja SUA au aratat ca UE este destinata irelevantei ca actor global , daca vor continua sa neglijeze cheltuielile de aparare , iar legatura de securitate transatlantica se va eroda masiv. “This week the US Ambassador to the UN Susan Power also called on Europeans to spend more on defence-arata French  The message was clear; Europe’s retreat from defence-sanity will not only force Europeans to live with far higher risk, it also risks in turn the effective end of a meaningful transatlantic security relationship.  The US taxpayer will not go on endlessly subsidising the defence of the European taxpayer.”   Din aceasta perspective, pentru strategul eurosceptic, Juncker are dreptate in propunerea sa:” So, JC is right.  Europeans must decide – either their states spend more on defence or they integrate their forces more closely and abandon any pretence to defence sovereignty.  For some defence integration makes perfect sense, for others not.  Therefore, the balance to be struck between ‘collective’ and ‘common’ defence is Europe’s quintessential twenty-first century strategic challenge.”  Rezolvarea acestei provocari strategice aflata in fata Europei va defini, intr-un fel sau altul, viitorul UE. Asadar, un suprastat federal dotat cu o armata comuna ori a free trade area , fiecare stat dispunand de o aparare credibila.Iar esecului precedentei incercari de constructie a unei armate europene ( EDC a fost respinsa de Parlamentul Frantei in 1954 ) trebuie luat in calcul de responsabilii europeni si deopotriva de liderii statelor componente ale UE. (European Defence Juncked? Wednesday, 11 March 2015-http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.ro/ )
 
      4.RAZBOI CU IRANUL ? Unul dintre evenimentele asteptate , in principal datorita consecintelor sale pe planul situatiei din Mideast , dar si pe o dimensiune  mai larga, a fost discursul premierului Israelului in fata Congresului SUA la 3 martie 2015. Aflat in campanie electorala , B. Netanyahu a pledat in fata congresmanilor americani pentru adoptarea unui atitudini dure fata de Iran , abandonarea liniei de incheiere a unui acord cu acesta si , eventual, lovirea militara a instalatiilor nucleare ale Teheranului in scopul intarzierii realizarii  armei atomice . Presa americana a reactionat diferit fata de pozitia expusa de Netanyahu in fata legislativului american. Pe de o parte, premierul israelian a fost condamnat pentru accentele critice la adresa politicii externe americane si a fost evidentiat rolul pozitiv pentru situatia internationala al unui acord cu Iranul ( Roger Cohen in NYT -  vezi articolul din 7 martie -http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/opinion/roger-cohen-netanyahus-iran-thing.html?_r=0# ). Pe de alta parte, asa cum a scris J. Muravchik la 8 martie in NYT,  “razboiul cu Iranul este probabil cea mai buna optiune “ a SUA. Analisti celebri au glosat pe marginea optiunii acord/razboi cu Iranul, intre ei Fareed Zakaria ( “Netanyahu enters never-never land”  ) David Ignatius ( Netanyahu’s zero-sum game on Iran” ) sau Charles Krauthammer ( “ Iran’s emerging empire” ). Care sunt argumentele optiunii razboiului ?. Iata-le infatisate de Joshua  Moravchik: “What if force is the only way to block Iran from gaining nuclear weapons? That, in fact, is probably the reality. Ideology is the raison d’etre of Iran’s regime, legitimating its rule and inspiring its leaders and their supporters. In this sense, it is akin to communist, fascist and Nazi regimes that set out to transform the world. Iran aims to carry its Islamic revolution across the Middle East and beyond. A nuclear arsenal, even if it is only brandished, would vastly enhance Iran’s power to achieve that goal.” ; “only military actions — by Israel against Iraq and Syria, and through the specter of U.S. force against Libya — have halted nuclear programs. Sanctions have never stopped a nuclear drive anywhere.”  “Tehnica” utilizata de autor in infatisarea acestor argumente este aceea a ridicarii de intrebari si a identifica raspunsul potrivit la ele: “Wouldn’t an attack cause ordinary Iranians to rally behind the regime? Perhaps, but military losses have also served to undermine regimes, including the Greek and Argentine juntas, the Russian czar and the Russian communists.”; “Wouldn’t destroying much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure merely delay its progress? Perhaps, but we can strike as often as necessary. Of course, Iran would try to conceal and defend the elements of its nuclear program, so we might have to find new ways to discover”;” And finally, wouldn’t Iran retaliate by using its own forces or proxies to attack Americans — as it has done in Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia — with new ferocity? Probably. We could attempt to deter this by warning that we would respond by targeting other military and infrastructure facilities.Concluzia autorului contrazice ferm actuala orientare a administratiei Obama , actiunea militara fiind –potrivit autorului- singura solutie la amenintarea inarmarii nucleare iraniene : “Yes, there are risks to military action. But Iran’s nuclear program and vaunting ambitions have made the world a more dangerous place. Its achievement of a bomb would magnify that danger manyfold. Alas, sanctions and deals will not prevent this.” Articolul a avut mai mult de 5000 de comentarii ale cititorilor. ( vezi: Joshua Moravchik, War with Iran is probably our best option- http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/war-with-iran-is-probably-our-best-option/2015/03/13/fb112eb0-c725-11e4-a199-6cb5e63819d2_story.html?tid=pm_opinions_pop. )
 
       15 martie 2015
 
                                                MIHAIL E. IONESCU

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