Here are some conclusions:

1. In Europe there is a strong inertia of the old post-cold war narrative of the future building on shared values ​​(neoliberal) and not on the power policy, a vector imposed by the new US orientation under the Trump administration; this is particularly noticeable in the case of small countries among both political and military officials and international security experts;

2. There is a strong reaction to the signals received on the conciliation with Russia by the major European powers (Germany): the case of Russia's readmission to the Parliament of the Council of Europe on 17 May a.m. ;

3. The US-China dispute, for the time being only focused on trade, has gained visible signs of a hegemony struggle between the hegemon and the contender;

4. Europe (the great powers) simultaneously views two trends: a. Considering NATO as a hope for the future, thus re-establishing transatlantic links; and b) a prudent policy towards Russia, including engaging in dialogue with it, as if some were "conciliatory"

The State of the World and of Europe (2)

The State of the World and of Europe (1)

In recent weeks, we have witnessed an evolution of unusual events, Venezuela being in focus. It looks as a far away flashpoint, but corroborating it with other recent evolutions, we may anticipate new patterns in the international relations. 

What has happened in the international system of states in the last few weeks - practically from the end of October to the present - shows that the systemic crisis, the global liberal order, has deepened. Its virtual death was announced in a premonitory article signed by Richard Haas, president of the 'Council of Foreign Relations - USA', published on March 21, 2018. The Liberal World Order, RIP, was an obituary / realistically to the disappearance of agreements installed systemically after World War II and, especially, since the end of the Cold War. The author of the article makes clear - "liberal world order is not liberal nor global nor orderly".