Osaka. The G-7 meeting in Japan (end of June 2019) was awaited with much interest in the Xi-Trump meeting and the possibility of a decision in the war between the two superpowers, at the initiative of D. Trump. Perhaps Putin's interview in the Financial Times (June 27th), through an unprecedented attack on neo-liberal ideology, has raised even more expectations on the eve of the reunion (the Russian and American leaders were due to meet in Japan and the quasi-similar hostile views were known of the two regarding some neo-liberal accents), but the focus of global attention remained on the Trump-Xi meeting. And this has a simple explanation. In the last years - from 2011-2012, any prognosis on the size of the international system and its state in 2025, 2030, 2035 and so on - drafted by prestigious US institutions or other horizons - specified that systemic "engines" would work in the future depending on the nature of US-China relations. To give an example: the 'alternative worlds' of the years 2035-2040 were planned - and they are in the number of four - and defined by the way in which the relations between the two "big ones" were then evaluated - cooperation and its degree or hostility and its nature

Brexit. June 2019 saw, with regard to Brexit, developments that may be decisive. Referring to Theresa May's decision to resign as a result of the united parliamentary rejection of the deal he has concluded with the EU, thus opening up the succession of the post of prime minister, hugging the orientation / option of Conservative Party members (about 160,000 members of the tens of millions who take part in the regular parliamentary elections). Two personalities have been depicted in the preferences of the conservative electorate: Boris Johnson, known as Brexiteer, but with old anti-continental orientation states since he was an accredited journalist in Brussels to refer to EU affairs for big British daily newspapers; the other, Jeremy Hunt, was also a member of the May cabinet as Foreign Minister, but different from the competitor through realistic vision and respectable democratic beliefs (so with firm opinions not borrowed or influenced by strong personalities such as President Trump).
But this 10 Downing Street competition was, from a point of view, auspicious, because it revealed how much changed over the past two years - since the June 2016 referendum - the British national political stratification and the ruling party's guidelines. Some obvious sociological indications are simply astounding and highlight that the British political establishment has changed enormously and deserves to wonder whether this is due to Brexit or is the result of developments that are related to the current digital era of instantaneous information and participation ubiquitous human to its diffusion and production, but also to the effects of globalisation and technological breakthroughs.

With the implications for the long-term future (15-20 years), perhaps the most important event of June 2019 has been climbing to an unfinished US-Iran war.
The previous tabs of this already voluminous historical record are well known. When the experts refer to Iran-US contentious, they do not forget his roots: the CIA's CIA-run in the early 1950s; the Iranian theocratic revolution and the breakdown of chess, with the current regime in place in 1979; (June 28 - June 1, 2019) by the Islamic militant in Tehran by the Islamic militants in November 1979 and the holding of dozens of US hostages for 444 days, shiit militancy promoted globally, etc. [...]

 The dangers that Iran would acquire with the atomic weapon mobilized the international community, resulting in the conclusion in July 2015 of a nuclear agreement between the 'six' (five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and Iran, whereby the latter took the obligation - in exchange for the lifting of the economic and financial sanctions to limit the uranium enrichment program to controllable limits, also admitting on-site inspections.
But the deal ended there was not without strong opponents [...] The active role played by Iran in the civil war in Syria, supporting Bashar Assad, is an eloquent demonstration of Iran's geopolitical activism, its goals being read in versions different from the players regional politicians and, depending on their narratives, by drawing a tinkle of contradictions difficult to define and manage.

Beginning in May 2019, the worst systemic disruptive action appeared threatening in June - it was the war ready to break between the US and Iran. The danger of such a war has not been defeated, although it seems that American airplanes were already airborne to apply a 'correction' to Tehran, but on the global scene there were other no less important and systemic disruptions.
The US-Iran war struck the door in the second decade of June 2019. Once more Persian Gulf oil boats were damaged by uncontrolled actions by terrorists or elsewhere - and Iran refused to decide any connection with them, the temperature rose suddenly when the Iranian defeat shot down an American drones on June 19th. It was the worst case incident since Washington in the last months deployed naval forces in the Persian Gulf.

Here are some conclusions:

1. In Europe there is a strong inertia of the old post-cold war narrative of the future building on shared values ​​(neoliberal) and not on the power policy, a vector imposed by the new US orientation under the Trump administration; this is particularly noticeable in the case of small countries among both political and military officials and international security experts;

2. There is a strong reaction to the signals received on the conciliation with Russia by the major European powers (Germany): the case of Russia's readmission to the Parliament of the Council of Europe on 17 May a.m. ;

3. The US-China dispute, for the time being only focused on trade, has gained visible signs of a hegemony struggle between the hegemon and the contender;

4. Europe (the great powers) simultaneously views two trends: a. Considering NATO as a hope for the future, thus re-establishing transatlantic links; and b) a prudent policy towards Russia, including engaging in dialogue with it, as if some were "conciliatory"